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CROSS-EXAMINATION, COLLEGE SEXUAL-
ASSAULT ADJUDICATIONS, AND THE
OPPORTUNITY FOR TUNING UP THE
"GREATEST LEGAL ENGINE EVER INVENTED"
H. Hunter Bruton*
With its reputation as the "greatest legal engine ever invented"
cross-examination rarely receives critical evaluation. This Article seeks
to narrow that academic gap and offer pragmatic advice to policymakers
and judges considering the in-the-trenches issues of cross-examination.
Despite a great body of empirical and interdisciplinary work on cross-
examination, legal scholarship often relegates discussion of cross-exami-
nation's benefits and costs to an errant footnote or a short paragraph.
But cross-examination's efficacy should not be an afterthought or aside to
doctrinal exegesis. Answers to the hardest questions about the presence,
scope, and format of cross-examination rely on assumptions about the
benefits and costs of cross-examination much more than they do analysis
of seventeenth century English opinions. This Article considers potential
lessons from a setting in which systematic preferences with regard to
cross-examination differ markedly from those in traditional adjudications.
The current issue of cross-examination's role in college sexual-as-
sault adjudications is both the impetus for this project and the vehicle for
reexamination. This Article explores questions about cross-examination's
efficacy. Does focusing on witness demeanor during cross-examination
hurt or help a hearing's accuracy? Which questioning techniques im-
prove truth seeking and which ones only abuse witnesses and harm the
system?
However, the knowledge gathered herein has much broader applica-
bility. Shifting legal debates mere inches away from tired references to
tradition and towards critical evaluation means that policymnakers and
judges alike have a chance at meaningful reform. Even the best engines
need a tune-up. It is time to reexamine assumptions about cross-
examination.
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Thanks to Judge Allyson K. Duncan, who has been an invaluable mentor and teacher. Thanks
to Professors Joseph Blocher, Elisabeth D. de Fontenay, and Joan Magat for their helpful
comments and edits. And of course, thanks to Professor Lisa Griffin, who not only assisted
me at every stage of this project, but also spent countless hours teaching, mentoring, and
supporting me throughout my time at Duke.
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INTRODUCTION
Few things are as engrained in the American judicial system as
cross-examination.' The Confrontation Clause enshrines it as a constitu-
tional right in criminal trials. 2 Due process requires the opportunity for
cross-examination in civil trials and many administrative hearings.3 One
can scarcely read a trial-practice case, textbook, or law-review article
without seeing John Henry Wigmore's quote proclaiming cross-examina-
tion "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."4
And popular culture portrayals of the cross-examination that wins the
day evince our societal adherence to the view that cross-examination en-
sures just outcomes.5 Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is a
dearth of legal scholarship examining cross-examination's true benefits
and costs.6 But is cross-examination necessary to discovering the truth?
Is it necessary to a fair hearing? In its current structure, do its benefits
outweigh its costs?
Most colleges and universities across the United States resoundingly
reply no to each of these questions when it comes to their internal sexual-
assault adjudications. 7 The decision to remove cross-examination from
these proceedings has required policymakers, practitioners, and scholars
alike to critically reevaluate what we gain and lose by having cross-
examination.
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I gives a brief overview of
the social and legal frameworks that led colleges and universities to jetti-
son cross-examination, the challenges these institutions now face as a
result, and alternatives to the current structure. Alternatives in mind, Part
II evaluates cross-examination's benefits and costs, noting the implica-
tions of adopting alternatives to cross-examination in the college context.
The Article concludes by noting what broader lessons this examination
of cross-examination offers.
I See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay's Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 71
(2009).
2 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
3 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970).
4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 32 (James H.
Chadbourn ed., 1974); David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634,
1644 (2009); Jules Epstein, Cross-Examination: Seemingly Ubiquitous, Purportedly Omnipo-
tent, and "At Risk", 14 WIDENER L. REV. 429, 429 (2009).
5 See Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 1353-54 (2005).
6 See Lisa Kern Griffin, The Content of Confrontation, 7 DUKE J. CONsT. L. & PUB.
POt'Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 51, 63 (2011) (noting that the benefits and costs of cross-examination
have "rarely received critical evaluation"); Richard 0. Lempert, Built on Lies: Preliminary
Reflections on Evidence Law As an Autopoietic System, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 345 (1998).
7 See, e.g., Cleta Mitchell & Trent Lott, Rethinking How We Deal With Campus Sexual
Assault, WASHINGTON PosT, Oct.4, 2015, http://wapo.st/lNf3WYt?tid=SS-mail.
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Many readers will come to this piece with preconceived notions
about the proper balance to strike in court and college proceedings. My
intention here is not to argue for one process or another, but to provide
some clarity about tradeoffs involved in requiring or rejecting cross-ex-
amination. Among the many values that these proceedings purport to
serve, accuracy and fairness are paramount. Yet the connection between
allowing cross-examination and advancing these values receives little
critical examination. Decision makers too often cite long-standing and
largely unevaluated perceptions as concrete substantiation for their con-
clusions.8 Empirical evidence may not determine answers to the ultimate
conclusions, but the same is not true for all the subsidiary questions that
must be answered along the way. In undertaking reform, policymakers,
judges, and college administrators should reevaluate traditional assump-
tions about the benefits and costs of cross-examination. At least in the
college context, this reevaluation will help reformers find a sensible mid-
dle ground between prohibition of cross-examination and full-scale trial-
type procedures.
I. SEXUAL-ASSAULT ADJUDICATIONS ON CAMPUS
Although the fight against sexual assault and rape on college cam-
puses has been a problem for years, recent government action has
brought the debate about solutions into the national spotlight.9 On April
4, 2011, the Office of Civil Rights for the U.S. Department of Education
("OCR") released policy guidance' 0 detailing steps that colleges had to
take to comply with Title IXI'-the federal statute prohibiting sex dis-
crimination in education. This guidance and similar changes to federal
mandates over the last six years,1 2 has resulted in a dramatic shift in how
8 For example, in Coy v. Iowa, the Court remarked that "the perception that confronta-
tion is essential to fairness has persisted over the centuries because there is much truth to it."
487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988). The evidence for this truth came from similar statements in prior
cases. Id.
9 For purposes of these adjudications, colleges define "sexual assault" and "rape" them-
selves, but this Article uses the term "sexual assault" to cover any adjudication involving
claims of rape, sexual assault, or other impermissible sexual behavior.
10 Widely known as the "Dear Colleague Letter." Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant
Sec'y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. (Apr. 4, 2011) (hereinaf-
ter "DCL"), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf. As gui-
dance, it should not be binding, but the administrative issues occasioned by DCL have been
covered in other Articles. See, e.g., Tamara Rice Lave, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication:
Why Universities Should Reject the Dear Colleague Letter, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 915 (2016).
11 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (2012).
12 For an expansive discussion of the federal regulatory framework see Laura L. Dunn,
Addressing Sexual Violence in Higher Education: Ensuring Compliance with the Clery Act,
Title IX and VAWA, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 563, 567-71 (2014); Emily D. Safko, Note, Are
Campus Sexual Assault Tribunals Fair?: The Need for Judicial Review and Additional Due
Process Protections in Light of New Case Law, 84 FORDHAM L. REv. 2289, 2293-2302
(2016).
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colleges investigate and adjudicate sexual-assault complaints on their
campuses.13
Many see this as a welcome solution to problems of under-reporting
and under-enforcement.1 4 Victimized students often find police investi-
gations and criminal trials invasive and traumatizing.' 5 A student subject
to a sexual assault' 6 who does not want to turn to the criminal-justice
system can instead seek justice on campus.' 7 However, others express
concerns that these new procedures severely limit the accused student's
opportunity to receive a fair hearing."' Members of top law-school fac-
ulties have issued statements condemning these campus policies.19
Mothers of falsely accused students have started organizations like Fami-
lies Advocating for Campus Equality (FACE) and Save Our Sons to raise
awareness and provide resources to other accused students. 20
These commendations and criticisms apply in largely the same fash-
ion to colleges across the nation. Although structures vary somewhat
13 See, e.g., Nick Anderson, Men Punished in Sexual Misconduct Cases on College Cam-
puses Are Fighting Back, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 20, 2014, http://wpo.st/z9a62.
14 See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 12, at 566, 572-74, 578-584. Some Senators recently
requested even more funding for OCR. See Letter from Kirsten Gillibrand, et al., (Mar. 17,
2016), https://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/gillibrand-mccaskill-lead-bi-
partisan-letter-for-new-resources-to-fight-sexual-assaults-on-college-campuses.
15 Katharine K. Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be A Crime, 100 MINN. L. REV.
221, 238, 260-62 (2015).
16 This Article uses "complainant" and "victim" to refer to students bringing these com-
plaints. But this use implies nothing about the guilt of the accused, nor is it meant to take a
position in the debate on how to refer to targets of sexual assault.
17 Eliana Dockertman, The Vanderbilt Rape Case Will Change the Way Victims Feel
About the Courts, TIME, Jan. 29, 2015, http://time.com/3686617/the-vanderbilt-rape-case-will-
change-the-way-victims-feel-about-the-courts/; see also Baker, supra note 15, at 232 & n.41;
Jeff Guo, What We Know About the Data on College Sexual Assaults, WASHINGTON POST, Oct.
28, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/10/28/what-we-know-
about-data-the-on-college-sexual-assaults/ (noting recent rise in reporting rates on campuses).
18 See Matthew R. Triplett, Note, Sexual Assault on College Campuses: Seeking the Ap-
propriate Balance Between Due Process and Victim Protection, 62 DUKE L.J. 487, 490-91
(2012); Stuart Taylor Jr. & KC Johnson, The New Standard for Campus Sexual Assault: Guilty
Until Proven Innocent, NATIONAL REVIEW, Dec. 30, 2015, http://www.nationalreview.com/
article/428910/campus-rape-courts-republicans-resisting; Tovia Smith, Some Accused of Sex-
ual Assault On Campus Say System Works Against Them, NPR, Sept. 3, 2014, http://
www.npr.org/2014/09/03/345312997/some-accused-of-campus-assault-say-the-system-works-
against-them.
19 Open Letter from 21 Law Professors, (May 19, 2016) http://www.saveservices.org/
wp-content/uploads/Law-Professor-Open-Letter-May-16-2016.pdf; Michael Fein, Rethinking
Harvard's Sexual Assault Policy, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 15, 2014, http://www.bostonglobe.
com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-sexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUu
WMnqbM/story.html; Eugene Volokh, Open Letter from 16 Penn Law School Professors
About Title IX and Sexual Assault Complaints, WASHINGTON PosT, Feb. 19, 2015, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/02/19/open-letter-from-16-penn-
law-school-professors-about-title-ix-and-sexual-assault-complaints/.
20 Fred Barbash, 'Toxic Environment' for Sons Accused of Campus Sex Offenses Turns
Mothers Into Militants, WASHINGTON PosT, Aug. 29, 2016, http://wpo.st/vDa62.
2017] CROss-EXAMINATION 149
across institutions, most colleges now have similar procedures for inves-
tigating and adjudicating complaints of sexual assault. 2 1 After an office
of student affairs receives a complaint, it investigates and gathers prelim-
inary evidence, often requiring the accused student to respond to allega-
tions before the adjudication begins. 22  Next, the complainant and
accused appear before an adjudicatory panel-comprised mainly of uni-
versity staff-which hears arguments, questions witnesses, and renders
factual and legal findings. 2 3 Most colleges also have an appellate-review
process. 24
While these proceedings mirror trials in some ways, many of the
procedural protections normally afforded criminal or civil defendants are
markedly absent. 2 5 Colleges severely limit the accused student's ability
to conduct discovery, and the panel bases its decision primarily on evi-
dence gathered by the college itself.2 6 Accused students often receive no
representation, and colleges heavily restrict what role privately retained
counsel can play in these proceedings. 2 7 The accused has no right to
cross-examine witnesses, and in most cases can only propose witnesses
or questions to the panel, which questions witnesses itself.28 At all
stages of the adjudication, the accused's role is narrowly circumscribed.
21 See, e.g., Triplett, supra note 18, at 492-93; Barbash, supra note 20; see also Doe v.
Cummins, No. 16-3334, 2016 WL 7093996, at *1-2 (6th Cir. Dec. 6, 2016) (unpublished)
(reviewing step-by-step the procedure of one university).
22 Triplett, supra note 18, at 492-93. Colleges often employ private investigators not
subject to cross-examination, raising further concerns about bias. Ric Feld, This Georgia
Lawmaker Is a Champion for College Men Accused of Rape. And He's Winning., MOTHER
JONES, June 20, 2016, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/05/earl-ehrhart-title-ix-
lawsuit.
23 Triplett, supra note 18, at 493; Barbash, supra note 20.
24 Triplett, supra note 18, at 493.
25 Barbash, supra note 20; Lara Ulrich, How Colleges Investigate Sexual Assault on
Campus, CONSTITuTION DAILY (June 16, 2016), http://blog.constitution center.org/2016/06/
how-colleges-investigate-sexual-assault-on-campus/; see also Cummins, 2016 WL 7093996, at
*1-2; Doe v. Brandeis Univ., No. CV 15-11557-FDS, 2016 WL 1274533, at *7 (D. Mass.
Mar. 31, 2016).
26 Rich McHugh & Ronan Farrow, A Hostile System? How Colleges Are Responding to
Campus Sexual Assaults, TODAY, Oct. 12, 2016, http://www.today.com/health/how-colleges-
are-responding-sexual-assault-campus-t103823; Triplett, supra note 18, at 523-25; Ulrich,
supra note 25; Djuna Perkins, Behind the Headlines: Ai Insider's Guide to Title IX and the
Student Discipline Process for Campus Sexual Assaults, BosTON BAR JOURNAL, July 8, 2015,
https://bostonbarjournal.com/2015/07/08/behind-the-headlines-an-insiders-guide-to-title-ix-
and-the-student-discipline-process-for-campus-sexual-assaults/.
27 Colleges are not required to provide counsel and differ in how they allow privately
retained counsel to participate in the process. Triplett, supra note 18, at 525-26; Barbash,
supra note 20.
28 Triplett, supra note 18, at 520-22; Barbash, supra note 20; see also Cummins, 2016
WL 7093996, at *1-2.
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The entire process resembles an inquisitorial system much more than an
adversarial one. 2 9
Beyond the structural problems, reports continue to surface of cur-
sory proceedings predetermined to expel or suspend accused students. 30
The following deposition taken from a university official in a recent suit
against George Mason University illustrates this problem:
Q. . . . Is it your testimony that when John walked into
your office on October 8, 2014, you had essentially
prejudged his case before you even spoke to him?
A. Haven't I already answered that?
Q. Answer it again.
A. Yes. Essentially....
Q. Let's take essentially out of it. When he walked into
your office on October 8, 2014, having met with Jane,
having read her appeal, and having looked at all the evi-
dence, you had prejudged his case, right?
A. Yes. But I was giving him the opportunity to discuss
it with me.
Q. And nothing he said was going to make a difference,
right?
A. Nothing he did say made a difference.
Q. And nothing that you can think of that he could have
possibly said would have made a difference, correct?
A. The best I can answer the question, correct.3 '
These structural flaws and biased adjudications demand attention as
legal challenges to these proceedings continue to grow,32 with accused
29 Other differences raising criticism include redefining sexual assault to include behav-
ior not found in other legal definitions; consolidating the investigation and adjudication pro-
cess in one office-often the same office responsible for Title IX compliance; using a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard; and providing no representation. See supra notes
18-19.
30 Baker, supra note 15, at 269; McHugh & Farrow, supra note 26; Barbash, supra note
20; Feld, supra note 22.
31 Excerpt from Eugene Volokh, Court: George Mason University Violated Due Process
When Expelling Student For Alleged BDSM-related Sex Assault, WASHINGTON PosT (Mar. 4,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/03/04/court-
george-mason-university-violated-due-process-while-expelling-student-for-alleged-bdsm-re-
lated-sex-assault/ (alteration in original). Court proceedings reported at Doe v. Rector & Visi-
tors of George Mason Univ., 179 F.Supp.3d 583 (E.D.Va. 2016).
32 One recent estimate claims that "[t]here are currently more than 100 pending legal
cases involving alleged due process violations in campus sexual assault adjudication[s]."
Derek Quizon, Critics Questioning Role of Universities in Title IX Cases, THE DAILY PRO-
GRESS (May 28, 2016), http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/local/critics-questioning-role-of-
universities-in-title-ix-cases/article e4lcfc7a-4318-5d47-a587-ae3cdf0dcc75.html. For a dis-
cussion of the due-process claims' legal merits see Safko, supra note 12, at 2293-2302; see
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students bringing their complaints to the courtroom. 33 Some seek dam-
ages. 3 4 Others call on courts to invalidate suspensions and expulsions.3 5
Although initially unresponsive, courts have recently been issuing
favorable rulings to accused students challenging campus investigations
and adjudications. 3 6 And even OCR-the office responsible for pushing
for these procedures-has begun to investigate reports of college admin-
istrators running roughshod over accused students' rights.3 7
Against this backdrop, the public is increasingly in favor of the
criminal courts reclaiming their role in these investigations and adjudica-
tions.3 8 Critics worry that these unfair proceedings have unintended re-
sults, "simultaneously failing to punish rapists adequately and branding
students sexual assailants when no sexual assault occurred." 39 In the
end, unfair proceedings undermine efforts to combat sexual assault. 40
Federal lawmakers are once again taking notice, and considering ways to
address the concerns raised. 4 1
also KLINTON W. ALEXANDER & KERN ALEXANDER, HIGHER EDUCATION LAW: POLICY AND
PERSPECTIVES 172-220 (2011).
33 See, e.g., Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., No. 1:15-CV-209, 2015
WL 5553855, at *18 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2015) subsequent proceedings at No. 1:15-CV-209,
2016 WL 775776, at *10 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2016); Jake New, Suits From the Accused, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (May 1, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/05/01/students-ac-
cused-sexual-assault-struggle-win-gender-bias-lawsuits; Anderson, supra note 13.
34 Stephen Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual
Assault on College Campuses, 40 N. Ky. L. REV. 49, 74-75 (2013) (noting recent settle-
ments); Barbash, supra note 20; Allie Grasgreen, New Scrutiny for Sexual Assault Cases, IN-
SIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 6, 2011), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/09/06/new-
scrutiny-sex-assault-cases.
35 See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of S. California, No. B262917, 2016 WL 1321509, at *20 (Cal.
Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2016); OCR has also become a target. See, e.g., Post Editorial Board, The
Lawsuit that Might Rock College Sexual Assault Cases, NY POST (Apr. 23, 2016), http://
nypost.com/2016/04/23/the-lawsuit-that-might-rock-college-sexual-assault-cases/.
36 Safko, supra note 12, at 2305-22 (surveying cases); Barbash, supra note 20; Scott
Jaschik, Title IX Victory For Man Suing Over Sex Assault Finding, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Aug. 1,
2016, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/08/01/federal-appeals-court-revives-title-ix-
suit-male-student-challenging-sex-assault; Jake New, Out of Balance: Colleges Lose Series of
Rulings in Suits Brought by Male Students Accused of Sexual Assault. In Stinging Decisions
Judges Fault Lack of Due Process, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Apr. 14, 2016, https://
www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/04/14/several-students-win-recent-lawsuits-against-col-
leges-punished-them-sexual-assault.
37 Press Release, Students Accused of Sexual Misconduct Had Title IX Rights Violated by
Wesley College, Says U.S. Department of Education, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., Oct. 12, 2016,
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/students-accused-sexual-misconduct-had-title-ix-
rights-violated-wesley-college-says-us-department-education.
38 T. Rees Shapiro, New Poll Shows Support For Greater Police Role in College Sexual
Assaults, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 9, 2015), http://wpo.st/VMa62; Ulrich, supra note 25.
39 Jed Rubenfeld, Mishandling Rape, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/opinion/sunday/mishandling-rape.html?_r-O.
40 See Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Trouble With Teaching Rape Law, THE NEW YORKER
(Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trouble-teaching-rape-law.
41 Nick Anderson, Under DeVos, Education Department Likely to Make Significant Shift
on Sexual Assault, WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 18, 2017), https://wpo.st/8SHb2; Safko, supra
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Either to stem the tide of legal liability or in response to future leg-
islative change, colleges will once again have to revamp their procedures
for investigating and adjudicating sexual assault. The stakes are quite
high in this context because outside forces aggravate the unenviable posi-
tion colleges find themselves in.4 2 If federal regulators or victims'
groups view a procedure as too harmful to complainants, then colleges
face investigation, loss of federal funding, or suits from victims. 4 3 If the
procedure swings too far to the other side, colleges must defend them-
selves in expensive litigation brought by accused students."4 The pres-
ence and form of cross-examination will be among reformers' central
concerns.
Currently most schools err on the side of disallowing cross-exami-
nation. 45 Most colleges allow witness questioning only from the adjudi-
cators, sometimes with the caveat that parties may submit questions to
the panel. 46 Under the panel-submission-only model, parties cannot ask
note 12, at 2300-02; Jake New, Guidance or Rule Making?: The U.S. Department of Educa-
tion's Guidance on How Colleges Handle Cases of Sexual Violence and Harassment Improp-
erly Created Sweeping Regulatory Changes, Republican Senators Say. INSIDE HIGHER ED, Jan.
7, 2016, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/01/07/senators-challenge-legality-us-gui-
dance-campus-sexual-assault; Susan Svrluga, Do Students Get a Fair Hearing? An Effort to
Change How Colleges Handle Sexual Assaults, WASHINGTON PosT (July 29, 2015), http://
wpo.st/ENa62 (describing how state lawmakers are also involved). See, e.g., Feld, supra note
22.
42 See, e.g., CBS New York, At Least 75 Men Suing Colleges Over Unfair Sexual Alle-
gation Repercussions, Discrimination, CBS NEW YORK, Mar. 23, 2016, http://newy-
ork.cbslocal.com/2016/03/23/college-sexual-assault-lawsuits/.
43 Triplett, supra note 18, at 495-97; ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at 500.
44 Cases reach mixed results on whether due process requires cross-examination, and if
so, what form it must take. See, e.g., Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 147 (N.D.N.Y.
1997) (finding that questions directed through the panel would satisfy due process).
45 The Dear Colleague Letter and subsequent guidance discouraged colleges from al-
lowing cross-examinations in these proceedings. DCL, supra note 10, at 12; Letter from Cath-
erine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec'y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC. (Apr. 29, 2014) at 31, http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-
ix.pdf. The fact that most schools do not publish their adjudicatory procedures prevents a
comprehensive statistical evaluation of current prevailing trends. However, surveying the
schools that (1) publish procedures, or (2) whose procedures became public knowledge as a
result of OCR investigation, I could not find a single school allowing traditional cross-exami-
nation. See, e.g., UNC Equal Opportunity and Compliance Office, Procedures for Reporting
and Responding to Complaints of Discrimination, Harassment, and Related Misconduct In-
volving a Student as the Responding Party, at 23 https://sexualassaultanddiscriminationpolicy.
unc.edu/files/2014/08/ProceduresComplaintsAgainstStudents.pdf, OCR, Reading Room:
Case Resolutions, US DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
frontpage/faq/readingroom.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2017); see also Henrick, supra note 34,
at 66-67 (noting the difficulty involved in researching and writing on this topic).
46 See, e.g., Yale University Office of the Provost, University-Wide Procedures, YALE
UNIVERSITY (last updated Oct. 26, 2015) at 6, http://provost.yale.edu/uwc/procedures; Duke
University Student Affairs, Student Sexual Misconduct Policy and Procedures: Duke's Com-
mitment to Title IX, DUKE UNIVERSITY, https://studentaffairs.duke.edu/conduct/z-policies/stu-
dent-sexual-misconduct-policy-dukes-commitment-title-ix. (last visited Feb. 15, 2017); Safko,
supra note 12, at 2331-32.
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follow-up questions not submitted in advance, and must instead rely on
the panel to add questions necessary for a thorough examination.
While colleges can modify this process in many ways, this Article
primarily considers two possible alternatives. First, colleges can screen
or shield the victim from the accused, the panel, or both. 4 7 Colleges can
experiment with different screening formats: physical barriers without
video feed, one-way video feeds, two-way video feeds, and pre-recorded
testimony.4 8  Second, colleges could also employ impartial in-
termediaries-separate from the adjudicative panel-to perform cross-
examination. Before questioning, the accused would provide preliminary
questions and frameworks, and the intermediary would make initial edits
that the accused could see. 49 During examination, questions could be
funneled through an intermediary separate from the panel using simple
headset technology or related means;5 0 follow-up inquiries would occur
in real time, the only caveat being that the intermediary could omit or
adjust the format of impermissible questions. 5 '
But before colleges move to push cross-examination in some format
back into their adjudications they should examine its benefits and costs.
The remainder of this Article seeks to do just that. Beginning with accu-
racy, moving to fairness, and concluding with administrative costs, this
Article unpacks the traditional assumptions that surround cross-examina-
tion, discussing empirical work where relevant. While many of the prin-
ciples discussed herein have broader applicability, the focus of this
discussion highlights the role cross-examination plays in sexual-assault
cases, and the implications that adopting the alternatives discussed above
might have for adjudicating these cases in the college context.
47 "Shielding" herein encompasses physical and virtual screens interposed between the
witness and others. This Article mentions specific differences where relevant.
48 See Griffin, supra note 6, at 69 (noting that "video uplinks, satellite testimony, or
close-circuit questioning could supply meaningful confrontation"); Frederic Lederer, The Le-
gality and Practicality of Remote Witness Testimony: Eventually, the Question May Be
Whether Physical Presence Is Really Necessary At All, 20 PRAC. LITIGATOR 19, 22-24, 28-29
(2009). This list simplifies various technological setups currently possible, but is meant to
convey that colleges can alter shielding procedures that affect who the complainant can see
and hear. Carolyn W. Kenniston, You May Now "Call" Your Next Witness: Allowing Adult
Rape Victims to Testify Via Two-Way Video Conferencing Systems, 16 J. HIGH TECH. L. 96, 99
(2015) (noting growth in use, sophistication, and capability of trial videoconferencing
technology).
49 ANDREw E. TASLITz, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 117-20 (Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefanic eds., 1999); cf Louise Ellison, The Mosaic Art?: Cross-Examination
and the Vulnerable Witness, 21 LEGAL STUD. 353, 362-66 (2001) (detailing an intermediary
proposal where the intermediary only translates incomprehensible questions and does not edit
questions for content).
50 TASLITz, supra note 49, at 117-20; Rachel Zajac et al., Disorder in the Courtroom?
Child Witnesses Under Cross-Examination, 32 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 181, 195 (2012).
51 TASLrrz, supra note 49, at 117-20; see also Zajac et al., supra note 50, at 195.
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II. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CROSS-EXAMINATION
Cross-examination is assumed to aid in producing accurate and fair
outcomes. Before this assumption can be analyzed it must be broken
down into its two components. Although striving for accuracy and fair-
ness are not completely divorced goals, they each serve distinct pur-
poses.52 This section evaluates how cross-examination's structure and
mechanisms further a hearing's accuracy and improve its overall fair-
ness, and concludes by adding another often-overlooked consideration
for reformers to balance-the administrative cost of cross-examination. 5 3
A. Accuracy
When most people speak of an adjudicatory system's accuracy, they
are referring to its ability to approximate the "truth"-some version of
what really happened. At the American adversarial system's inception,
cross-examination was promoted as a way to "detect and thus deter [wit-
ness] prevarication and hence promote truthful outcomes." 54 Similarly,
the Supreme Court has described the right to cross-examination as "the
age-old tool for ferreting out truth in the trial process."55 Undoubtedly,
witness testimony plays an integral, if not paramount, role in divining the
truth.56 Factfinders 57 do their best to mine truth from the mountains of
evidence presented, but they are ill-equipped for the task, and when all
else fails, factfinders often credit a witness's version of truth in lieu of
coming to their own conclusions.58 But this reliance comes with a dan-
ger; the implicit assertion of relevance and verisimilitude shrouds correct
and incorrect testimony the same.59 Cross-examination gives advocates
an opportunity to remind factfinders that the truth about what really hap-
52 See David Alan Sklansky, Confrontation and Fairness, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 103,
105 (2012).
53 When possible, this Article discusses and cites scientific and empirical data. Admit-
tedly, empirical studies have their limits; they do not completely replicate the courtroom or
hearing experience. See, e.g. Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64
VAND. L. REV. 143, 178-79 (2011); H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of
Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar's Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776- 777 (1993). But experimental
studies come as close as society can get to testing the adversarial system's preconceived no-
tions. See Maria Hartiwig et al., Lie Detection From Multiple Cues: A Meta-analysis, 28
APPL. COGNIT. PSYCHOL. (2014); Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
1075, 1079 (1991).
54 JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF THE ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 270 (A.W.
BRIAN SIMPSON, ED., 2003).
55 Perry v. Leake, 488 U.S. 272, 283 n.7 (1989).
56 See Michael S. Pardo, Testimony, 82 TUL. L. REv. 119, 120 (2007).
57 "Factfinder" refers herein to judges, adjudicators, and juries. This Article uses more
specific terms where relevant.
58 See Michael S. Pardo, Self-Incrimination and the Epistemology of Testimony, 30 CAR-
Dozo L. REV. 1023, 1036-37 (2008).
59 See id. at 1036.
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pened may be buried beneath layers of witness deception, error, or both.
But how does cross-examination accomplish this goal?6 0
1. The Demeanor Myth
The advantages of cross-examination are not what conventional
wisdom suggests. Many believe that behavioral responses to questioning
signal witness deception, and also believe that factfinders can both pick
up on these responses and draw reliable conclusions from demeanor evi-
dence. 6 1 Our judicial system institutionalizes this belief in its approach
from investigation to adjudication to appeal. Investigators and interro-
gators receive training in detecting deception that focuses not on what
comes out of a suspect's mouth, but instead on what his eyes, hands, and
feet are doing when he is speaking. 62 This dogma also permeates
through to the courtroom. 6 3 The judicial system orders jurors to observe
witness demeanor closely, and the confidence judges have in their own
abilities to evaluate deception through demeanor evidence remains unwa-
vering. 6 4 Likewise, appellate courts give substantial deference to lower
courts' factual findings because "only the trial judge can be aware of the
variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the
listener's understanding of and belief in what is said."6 5 Yet, this persis-
tent belief lacks a foundation; overall, laypeople and experts alike are
terrible lie detectors when they focus on demeanor evidence. 66
To begin, scientific evidence proves that most, if not all, readily
observable behavioral cues assumed to indicate deceit do not actually do
60 Not analyzed herein is the plausible claim that cross-examination's presence deters
lying in pretrial proceedings because witnesses are afraid of being exposed on cross-examina-
tion. See, e.g., Roger C. Park, Adversarial Influences on the Interrogation of Trial Witnesses,
in ADVERSARIAL VERSUS INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEMS 131, 160-61 (Peter J. van Koppen & Steven D. Penrod eds., 2003).
61 Uviller, supra note 53, at 788-89; DETECTING DECEFION: CURRENT CHALLENGES
AND COGNITIVE APPROACHES XVi (Par Anders Granhag et al. eds., 2015); Simon, supra note
53, at 176.
62 See FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 101-53 (5th
ed. 2013) (describing the method of behavior-symptom analysis).
63 This is a problem in direct examination and for questions asked by a judge or inquisi-
tor, but this section focuses on how beliefs about demeanor affect cross-examination.
64 See, e.g., Honorable James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REV.
903, 918-30 (2000).
65 Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985).
66 ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LYING AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 2, 75-81, 217 (John Wiley & Sons Ltd. ed.,
2000); Aldert Vrij et al., Police Officers' Ability to Detect Deceit: The Benefit of Indirect
Deception Detection Measures, 6 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 185, 186 (2001); Lucy
Akehurst et al., Lay Persons' and Police Officers' Beliefs Regarding Deceptive Behaviour, 10
APPL. COGNIT. PSYCHOL. 461, 462, 468 (1996); see also Sara Landstrom et al., Children's Live
and Videotaped Testimonies: How Presentation Mode Affects Observers' Perception, Assess-
ment and Memory, 12 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 333, 334 (2007).
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so. 6 7 From evasive eyes to twitching toes, behavioral responses to ques-
tioning seem to be more idiosyncrasies than deception giveaways. Re-
searchers continue to investigate a few selected cues that may provide
useful information. Although not uniform in result, some studies have
found associations between paraverbal cues (e.g., voice pitch or vocal
tension) and deceit. 68 Likewise, a few studies have associated two subtle
visual cues with deceit-pupil dilation and chin raising.69 However, re-
cent research all but completely undermines the association between de-
ception and easily observed cues. 70
Furthermore, even the studies associating subtle behavioral cues
with deceit have important limitations. One limitation is that most stud-
ies can demonstrate only that a majority of liars exhibit a certain cue; the
implicit complication, of course, being that a significant population ex-
hibits the opposite behavior when lying.7 1 For example, one researcher
completing a meta-analysis of his past experiments found that 64% of
participants decreased certain movements during deception, while 35%
increased these movements during deception. 72 Furthermore, the im-
perceptibility of most visual and paraverbal cues presents another com-
plication for accurately analyzing demeanor evidence; observers in most
settings cannot reliably discern these phenomena without sophisticated
technical equipment. 7 3 And this limitation point towards a broader prob-
67 VRU, supra note 66, at 38, 54; Bella M. DePaulo et al., Cues to Deception, 129
PSYCHOL. BULL. 74-118 (2003).
68 Samantha Ann Mann et al., See No Lies, Hear No Lies: Difference in Discrimination
Accuracy and Response Bias When Watching or Listening to Police Suspect Interviews, 22
APPL. COGNIT. PSYCHOL. 1062, 1063 (2008) (citing studies); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of
the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credi-
bility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1193, 1200 (1993) (citing studies); cf Siegfried Ludwig Sporer
& Barbara Schwandt, Paraverbal Indicators of Deception: A Meta-analytic Synthesis, 20
APPL. COGNIT. PSYCHOL. 421, 422, 435-41 (2006) (noting conflicting studies, variance be-
tween studies, and its results demonstrating weak correlation of paraverbal behavioral cues
with deception).
69 See Simon, supra note 53, at 176 n.139 (noting that "[t]wo visual cues-pupil dilation
and chin raise-were found to be positively related to deceit, but they were observed in only
four studies each" (citing De Paulo et al., supra note 67, at 92)).
70 See, e.g., DETECTING DECEPTION: CURRENT CHALLENGES AND COGNITIVE AP-
PROACHES, supra note 61, at 45 (performing a meta-analysis and concluding "research on non-
verbal cues that distinguish truth from lies finds that such cues tend to be weak and inconsis-
tent and, to the extent there is empirical support for such cues, that support systematically
diminishes as research accumulates").
71 See, e.g., VRIJ, supra note 66, at 38.
72 Id.
73 Simon, supra note 53, at 179; see GRANHAG, VRU, & VERSCHUERE, supra note 61, at
317-323; VRU, supra note 66, at 32-33 (noting that vocal behaviors thought to differentiate
liars and truth-tellers "are usually very small (only a few hertz), and therefore only detectable
with sophisticated equipment"); Wellborn, supra note 53, at 1088 ("[Slubjects who receive
transcript[s] consistently perform as well as or better [at detecting lies] than subjects who
receive recordings of the respondent's voice.").
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lem with the underlying assumption about lie-detection and demeanor
evidence: studies consistently shows that focusing on demeanor does not
aid observers in deciding if a witness is telling the truth or lying.74
Put simply, even assuming a list of universal cues, ordinary observ-
ers cannot faithfully apply any methodological approach.7 5 Discerning
any information from demeanor requires that an observer simultaneously
process a flood of verbal evidence and a variety of subtle behavioral
cues. 76 Then the observer must account for any offsetting factors, and
objectively reach conclusions about both individual statements and over-
all credibility.7 7 Performing this task for one witness would be tough
enough, but that is not how most trials or hearings proceed. After ob-
serving the first witness, the factfinder must replicate this process for
successive witnesses, whose testimony must also be weighed against
prior witnesses.7 8
The possibility for erroneous conclusions only grows as these un-
realistic expectations combine with an individual observer's unreliable
hunches. 7 9 For one, observers can wrongly attribute cues to deceptive
behavior when other explanations exist.80 For instance, witness behavior
may be a response to the courtroom or hearing process itself.8' That is,
many cues people associate with deception are also reactions brought
about by the high stress environment of an adjudicatory hearing.8 2 Relat-
edly, cultural phenomena affect the presence, frequency, and meaning of
cues.8 3 And most ironically, repeat liars realize that observers attach sig-
nificance to certain behavioral cues and become adept at controlling
those cues. 8 4
Additionally, a courtroom or hearing context both alters and limits
how ordinary observers implement their typical deception-detection
74 Simon, supra note 53, at 176; Uviller, supra note 53, at 787; see generally VRIJ, Supra
note 66, at 92-93; Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Individual Differences in Judging
Deception: Accuracy and Bias, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 477 (2008).
75 VRu, supra note 66, at 54; Simon, supra note 53, at 177.
76 See Simon, supra note 53, at 177.
77 Id.
78 See Wellborn III, supra note 53, at 1080.
79 Bond & DePaulo, supra note 74, at 483; Akehurst et al., supra note 66, at 462.
80 See, e.g., Akehurst et al., supra note 66, at 468-69.
81 Simon, supra note 53, at 179.
82 Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of Cognitive Error,
57 STAN. L. REV. 291, 312 (2004); see VRIJ, supra note 66, at 93; Simon, supra note 53, at
179; Sara Landstrdm et al., Witnesses Appearing Live Versus on Video: Effects on Observers'
Perception, Veracity Assessments and Memory, 19 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 913, 914
(2005).
83 GRANHAG, VRIJ, & VERSCHUERE, supra note 61, at 177-79; VRIJ, supra note 66, at
88-91; Nancy Gertner, Videoconferencing: Learning Through Screens, 12 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 769, 784 (2004).
84 VRu, supra note 66, at 48, 219; see also Sporer & Schwandt, supra note 68, at 438.
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heuristics. 85 Observers do not evaluate demeanor in the courtroom the
way they usually do when interacting with friends or family.86 For one,
lawyers, not the observers, interact with the witnesses. Studies demon-
strate that a lawyer's demeanor towards the witness can prejudicially af-
fect an observer's conclusions about witness deception.87 In addition,
formal proceedings rarely place observers within inches of the witness,
making it harder, if not impossible, to pick up on subtle visual or audi-
tory cues to judge a witness's deceptiveness. 88
In fact, some studies illustrate that encouraging an observer to focus
on behavioral cues diminishes the observer's ability to detect decep-
tion.89 Faulty assumptions and misdirected attention explain these re-
sults. Most people wrongly assume that visual behavioral cues indicate
deception. 90 That assumption, combined with the problems discussed
above, leads observers to fixate on evidence that will either be irrelevant
or point them toward invalid conclusions about witness deception.9' At
the same time, this fixation diverts attention from phenomena that do
relate to deception detection. 92 Cross-examination's accuracy-increasing
functions has more to do with what the witness is being asked and how
questions are being presented, than with the witness's demeanor when
responding.
2. Witness Error and Deception
Cross-examination highlights the errors of well-intentioned and de-
ceptive witnesses alike. Witnesses can neglect to explain their account
fully or make mistakes. When a witness first testifies, her words are "a
selective presentation of aspects of what the witness remembers, organ-
ized in a willful or at least a purposeful manner." 93 Cross-examination
breaks down carefully curated narratives: "[it] places in the hands of the
cross-examiner some of the means to show the gaps between the truth
and the telling of it."9 4 What witnesses think they know may in fact be
85 See VRu, supra note 66, at 67-70, 76, 82-84, 93.
86 Uviller, supra note 53, at 780.
87 Id.; Wellborn, supra note 53, at 1080.
88 Simon, supra note 53, at 179; see GRANHAG, VRu, & VERSCHUERE, supra note 61, at
317.
89 Mann et al., supra note 68, at 1063; VRu, supra note 66, at 68, 76; see Wellborn,
supra note 53, at 1088 (summarizing psychological studies and noting that "some evidence
suggests that observation of facial behavior diminishes the accuracy of lie detection").
90 See Mann et al., supra note 68, at 1062; see also Simon, supra note 53, at 176.
91 See VRIJ, supra note 91, at 38-39. .
92 Id.; see also Epstein, supra note 92, at 444-45 (explaining how jurors have "a greater
preference and/or capacity" for visual, as opposed to aural, information and discussing studies
suggesting that visual focus affects "juror reception and retention of orally-presented proof").
93 ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 17 (2009).
94 Id.
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an illusion constructed by the unholy union between the human's brain
fallible nature and outside influences. 95
Probing questioning elicits details that did not appear in the wit-
ness's first account. 96 As the witness adds details, his story may change
or completely contradict original assertions. 97 Each new detail or differ-
ing characterization represents information the factfinder would not have
otherwise received.98 In so doing, adversarial questioning exposes wit-
ness error, or at least the source of possible error. 99
The shortcomings of perception and memory are among the errors
that remain hidden without cross-examination.10 0 Cross-examination re-
minds factfinders that the limitations of perception and memory affect
the verisimilitude of all testimony.10 1 Without this reminder, factfinders
may place undue weight on witness testimony.
Take eyewitness identifications as an example: empirical work has
laid bare the fallibility and malleability of eyewitness identification and
memory. 10 2 This holds true for victims of crime as well; one study found
that in 93% of wrongful rape convictions surveyed "a victim testified as
an eyewitness at trial." 10 3 But judges and jurors place great weight on
eyewitness testimony, and assume that eyewitnesses are rarely mis-
taken. 104 Cross-examination works to undermine this unwarranted as-
sumption. Questions can point out environmental limitations that reduce
the likelihood of a reliable identification, perceptive limitations of indi-
95 See VRIJ, supra note 66, at 150, 158.
96 John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examina-
tion, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 191, 241 (1999).
97 Id.
98 See Lempert, supra note 6, at 347 (noting "the value of information about context or
other matters that cross-examining the speaker might reveal"). But see Rachel Zajac &
Harlene Hayne, I Don't Think That's What Really Happened: The Effect of Cross-Examination
on the Accuracy of Children's Reports, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. APPLIED 187, 187 (2003)
("[I]t is equally possible that a witness may succumb to the effects of complex, misleading, or
aggressive questioning even when he or she was originally telling the truth.").
99 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009) ("Confrontation is
designed to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well.").
100 BURNS, supra note 93, at 18; see also Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to
Hearsay, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1339, 1355-58 (1987).
101 Daniel D. Blinka, Why Modern Evidence Law Lacks Credibility, 58 BuFF. L. REV.
357, 390-91 (2010).
102 BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 48-50 (2011); see generally
BRIAN L. CUTLER, EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
143-60 (2009); Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That Couldn't: Science, Mistaken Identifica-
tions, and the Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REV. 727, 735-41 (2007).
103 GARRETT, supra note 102, at 51.
104 Id. at 48, 54; Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 313
(2013) ("Despite mounting evidence linking eyewitness identification errors to wrongful con-
victions, a recent study revealed that jurors continue to disregard variables that detract from
eyewitness accuracy.").
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vidual witnesses, and possible contamination by actors such as
investigators. 0 5
Furthermore, perception and memory are not a witness's only lim-
its; biases color testimony. 0 6 Familial ties, financial interests, political
ideology, personal history, and a litany of other concerns tint how a wit-
ness perceives and recalls events. 07 Cross-examination remains one of
the only opportunities to bring these biases to factfinders' attention'08
because witnesses rarely volunteer this information.' 09 For example,
false sexual-assault complaints sometimes arise from the desire to cover-
up a consensual sexual encounter when others learn of it. 1o A complain-
ant's desire to protect her reputation, another romantic relationship, or a
relationship with disapproving parents can all serve as motivation. De-
ciding how a particular bias affects any witness is a decision for the
factfinder, but cross-examination performs the necessary task of uncov-
ering that possible bias in the first place.'
Moreover, witness testimony is only one piece in the evidentiary
puzzle; effective cross-examination contextualizes other trial evi-
dence.11 2 It explains how an opposing party obtained prior statements or
evidence pertaining to the witness."1 3 The line between discovering and
manufacturing evidence is a thin one. Investigators can unduly influence
witnesses in a range of evidence-gathering activities from identifications
to confessions. 14 This influence can transform a witness into a false
105 See GARRETr, supra note 102, at 127. But note also that some remain skeptical of the
ability of cross-examination to bring many of these errors to the factfinders attention. GAR-
RETT, supra note 102, at 260; Epstein, supra note 102, at 729.
106 Of course, biases can also serve as a motive for fabrication.
107 Blinka, supra note 101, at 386-88.
los Spencer Martinez, Bargaining for Testimony: Bias of Witnesses Who Testify in Ex-
change for Leniency, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 141, 160 (1999); see also PAUL BUTLER, LET'S
GET FREE: A Hip-Hop THEORY OF JUSTICE 14 (2010).
109 For instance, during direct examination, government informants often omit or lie
about possible motivations to testify, only to "recall" during cross-examination that charges
against them were dropped or reduced. See, e.g., GARRETr, supra note 102, at 128.
I 10 See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231-33 (1988) (discussing potential bias on
part of rape-complainant); Barbash, supra note 20.
Ill United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50 (1984); Alex Wood, Girl Describes Sex Abuse,
Denies Ulterior Motive, JOURNAL INQUIRER, June 9, 2016, http://www.joumalinquirer.con
crime andcourts/girl-describes-sex-abuse-denies-ulterior-motive/articleacfb7al e-2e53-
I le6-9c26-bflcd30fe5 1a.html.
1 12 See, e.g., Christie Anderson, Cop Admits Palm Island Mistakes, TowNsvILLE BULLE-
TIN, Mar. 7, 2016, http://www.townsvillebulletin.com.au/news/cop-admits-palm-island-mis
takes/news-story/42b8c4a2a0555e78d583f90007bl 5849.
113 See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 1, at 67.
114 See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation
Clause: A Proposal for A Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 561 (1992).
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conduit for information that otherwise would not have been offered." 5
Importantly, this contamination results not only from unethical investiga-
tors, but also investigators unaware of the truth-altering impact their ac-
tions may have on a witness."'6  Probing questioning cannot eliminate
outside influences on witnesses, but it does situate the evidence in the
context from which it was elicited."'7
Through questioning, advocates can chip away at the reliability of
an individual's testimony and prompt factfinders to consider the limita-
tions of testimony generally. Without this context, factfinders may reach
erroneous conclusions based on partial information." 8
Moreover, witnesses do lie, and cross-examination provides one of
the only opportunities to expose such deception. The cultural archetype
of a successful cross-examiner consists of an advocate whose quick ques-
tioning conquers deception, leaving even the most cunning witness with
the choice of admitting his lies or giving obviously inconsistent testi-
mony. The iconic performances of Tom Cruise or Joe Pesci come to
mind." 9 While many trials conclude without such Hollywood moments,
the ability to draw out substantive inconsistencies between the witness's
testimony and other evidence may assist factfinders in uncovering wit-
ness deception. 1 20 While not all inconsistencies arise from deceit,121
studies have reliably established a link between consistency in testimony
and truth telling.1 2 2 And in general, deceitful witnesses have a harder
time maintaining consistency under questioning that builds upon their
previous answers.1 2 3
115 See, e.g., Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children:
Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 33, 43-71, 95 (2000) (sum-
marizing recent studies indicating how certain lines of questioning can lead to false positives).
116 One study of exonerees wrongfully convicted based on their false confessions found
that detectives in 95% of the cases believed that they did not engage in the tactics that led to
contaminated or coerced confessions. But regardless of intent, these interrogations produced
patently false confessions. GARRETT, supra note 102, at 19-21.
117 Simon, supra note 53, at 182.
118 See GARRETr-, supra note 102, at 166-67 (investigating the role ineffective cross-ex-
amination played in wrongful convictions).
119 A FEw GOOD MEN (Columbia Pictures 1992); MY CousIN VINNY (Twentieth Century
Fox Films 1992).
120 These inconsistencies can occur within testimony, between the current testimony and
the witness's prior statements, and between the current testimony and other evidence. See
Griffin, supra note 6, at 64; see also Park, supra note 60, at 145-46 (explaining the commit-
and-contradict approach of cross-examination).
121 Especially for victims of crime, trauma can lead to memory errors. See, e.g., Nancy
Mehrkens Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 J.L. & Hum.
BEHAV. 413-22; see also VRJ, supra note 66, at 138-39.
122 DePaulo et al., supra note 67, at 92; Landstrdm et al., supra note 82, at 916; Judy
Zaparniuk et al., Assessing the Credibility of True and False Statements, 18 INT'L J.L & Psy-
CHIATRY 343, 344, 350 (1995).
123 Sanchirico, supra note 81, at 335-36; GRANHAG, VRIJ, & VERSCHUERE, supra note 61,
at 46; see also Vrij et al., supra note 75, at 164; Zajac et al., supra note 50, at 199.
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This occurs because remembering a fabrication and building on it
imposes significant cognitive strain or "cognitive load."124 One easy
way to understand the concept is to attempt a multiplication problem
mentally, for example 17 x 24.125 Performing this task is "mental work:
deliberate, effortful, and orderly." 26 Remembering the formula for
double-digit multiplication inflicts the initial cognitive strain. 127 Subse-
quently, computation adds to that cognitive load; you must multiply the
numbers one-by-one, at the same time remembering the results from the
last multiplication.1 2 8 Do you have the answer? If you are like most
law-review readers, this task was not easy. "You felt the burden of hold-
ing much material in memory, as you needed to keep track of where you
were and of where you were going, while holding on to the intermediate
result." 29
The questioning format of cross-examination tests truthfulness by
pushing a witness to the limits of her cognitive-load capabilities. At the
outset, lying is usually more cognitively taxing than truth telling for a
number of reasons:' 3 0 fabricating a lie requires more cognitive resources
than telling the truth; a liar monitors his demeanor and interviewers' de-
meanor more carefully to gauge his believability; and lying necessitates a
variety of other mental actions that truth-telling does not.' 3 1 All these
mental activities take a serious toll before unanticipated questions and
follow-up questions increase a witness's cognitive stress.
For liars already beginning with significant demands on their cogni-
tive capacities, answering unanticipated questions is like performing long
multiplication mentally. The fabricated narrative is the formula. An un-
anticipated question during cross-examination forces a deceptive witness
to generate an answer that fits within that formula.1 32 Each question
presents a new multiplication problem imposing its own cognitive de-
124 VRIJ, supra note 66, at 223; Hartwig et al., supra note 75, at 471; Sporer & Schwandt,
supra note 68, at 426; see also Aldert Vrij et al., Outsmarting the Liars: The Benefit ofAsking
Unanticipated Questions, 33 J.L. & Hum. BEHAV. 159, 160 (2009) (noting that increasing
cognitive loads "increase[s] the difference between liars and truth tellers").
125 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLow 20 (2011).
126 Id.
127 See id.
128 See id.
129 Id.
130 VRU, supra note 66, at 26; see also Aldert Vrij et al., Increasing Cognitive Load to
Facilitate Lie Detection: The Benefit ofRecalling an Event in Reverse Order, 32 J.L. & Hum.
BEHAV. 253, 254 (2008) (surveying then existing studies).
131 GRANHAG, VRU, & VERSCHUERE, supra note 61, at 205-07.
132 Chris William Sanchirico, "What Makes the Engine Go?" Cognitive Limitations and
Cross-Examination, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 507, 516 (2009); see also VRU, supra note66, at
41-42, 223 (noting strain imposed by a lie's content-complexity and how probing can reveal
holes).
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mands, only exacerbated further by the need to build off previous
answers.' 33
The opportunity for inconsistency grows at an alarming rate as
cross-examination progresses. If a witness's fabricated narrative does
not easily generate an answer to a question, then he must spontaneously
add new details, and in turn commit those details to memory.1 34 Moreo-
ver, the fabrication does not occur in a vacuum; the witness "must also
be calling to mind the set of external facts provable by the other side" 35
as to both the original fabrication and the additions.1 3 6 Then the ques-
tioner formulates follow-up questions based on the witness's answer. As
a deceptive witness attempts to answer these unanticipated questions, he
must account for recently added details.1 37 Each new question com-
pounds the demands on the witness's cognitive faculties.138 The decep-
tive witness must simultaneously fit each new fabrication within her
larger framework, evaluate the implications of the new fabrications for
future questions, and maintain consistency across questions.1 39 These
complications exponentially intensify cognitive strain, leading to a
greater chance of confusion and inconsistency.1 4 0 Long multiplication is
a poor descriptor; mental multivariate calculus is the more apt metaphor.
In contrast, truthful witnesses need only pull answers from memory. 14 1
"[T]his is not to say that spontaneous memory retrieval is always easy[,]
only that it is a good deal easier than the set of tasks facing the insincere
witness in the same position." 4 2
Still, other reasons besides struggling to maintain a lie may explain
why a witness might give inconsistent answers, and relying on the cogni-
tive-load theory alone will results in imperfect outcomes. In other
133 See GRANHAG, VRu, & VERSCHUERE, supra note 61, at 213-14; see also BUTLER,
supra note 108, at 13 (detailing how a police officer lying during cross-examination could not
answer the cross-examiner's questions).
134 Sanchirico, supra note 132, at 516; Aldert Vrij et al., Detecting Deception By Manipu-
lating Cognitive Load, 10 TRENDS IN COGNIT. Sci. 141, 141 (2006).
135 Sanchirico, supra note 81, at 336.
136 GRANHAG, VRu, & VERSCHUERE, supra note 61, at 206; VRIJ, supra note 66, at 223;
Sanchirico, supra note 132, at 516; Sporer & Schwandt, supra note 68, at 426.
137 See Vrij et al., supra note 124, at 160; Sanchirico, supra note 81, at 335.
138 Sanchirico, supra note 81, at 341; Gary L. J. Lancaster et al., Sorting the Liars From
the Truth Tellers: The Benefits ofAsking Unanticipated Questions on Lie Detection, 27 APPL.
COGNIT. PSYCHOL. 107, 107 (2013); Sanchirico, supra note 132, at 521; see also VRIJ, supra
note 66, at 26 (explaining cognitive strain caused by content-complexity).
139 GRANHAG, VRIJ, & VERSCHUERE, supra note 61, at 206; Sanchirico, supra note 132, at
516; Hartwig et al., supra note 75, at 481-82.
140 Simon, supra note 53, at 175; Sanchirico, supra note 81, at 322; see also Vrij et al.,
supra note 124, at 160 (noting similar implications in interrogations).
141 Sanchirico, supra note 81, at 336; Lancaster et al., supra note 138, at 108; see also
Hartwig et al., supra note 75, at 480 (finding that liars gave more inconsistent statements than
truth-tellers when evidence was disclosed after initial interrogation).
142 Sanchirico, supra note 81, at 336; see also Sporer & Schwandt, supra note 68, at 426.
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words, the same engine that uncovers truth in one context can conceal it
in another.1 4 3
Many advocates use cross-examination more to trap witnesses than
to add information.1 4 4 This strategy may be beneficial when witnesses
admit truthful information, but the types of questions "commonly used in
cross-examination include question formats that can limit the complete-
ness and accuracy of the answer; including leading questions, use of neg-
ative, closed questions, either/or questions, yes/no questions and multiple
questions." 4 5 This can limit relevant information, and frame the infor-
mation factfinders do receive in incomplete or inaccurate ways.
Similarly, witness suggestibility offers cross-examiners an enticing
opportunity to distort the truth.1 46 Experimental studies suggest that
cross-examination can mislead witnesses and cause them to change accu-
rate answers to inaccurate answers.1 47 Admittedly, there are more stud-
ies documenting how cross-examination negatively affects the accuracy
of child-victims' testimony,1 48 but the literature suggesting similar re-
sults for adult victims continues to grow.1 4 9 A number of factors contrib-
ute to the likelihood that a witness will revise what was at first accurate
testimony.
First, time and timidity are a cross-examiner's best friends. Cross-
examiners harness the uncertainty generated by the significant time lapse
between questioned events and the trial to pressure witnesses into chang-
ing their answers,'5 o and people become more susceptible to suggestibil-
143 See TASLITZ, supra note 49, at 128 ("'[Tlhere is ample empirical proof of the reliabil-
ity-distorting effects of traditional rape victim cross-examination.").
144 See, e.g., Charles J. Faruki, Cross-Examination That Hurts the Witness, Not You, 3
LITIG. 38, 39 (2007).
145 Tim Valentine & Katie Mara, The Effect of Cross-Examination on the Accuracy of
Adult Eyewitness Testimony, 25 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 554, 554 (2011); Mark R. Kebbell
et al., The Direct and Cross-Examination of Complainants And Defendants in Rape Trials: A
Quantitative Analysis of Question Type, 9 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 49, 55, 57 (2003).
146 Valentine & Mara, supra note 145, at 555; see also Cheryl A. Terrance et al., The Role
of Expectation and Memory-retrieval Techniques in the Construction of Beliefs About Past
Events, 14 APPL. COGNIT. PSYCHOL. 361, 374 (2000) ("Researchers have found that repeated
probing increased the likelihood that vivid and detailed memories for events which may not
have happened are reported.").
147 Valentine & Mara, supra note 145, at 558, 560; Zajac et al., supra note 50, at 197.
148 Zajac & Hayne, supra note 98, at 188, 191-93; Saskia Righarts, Sarah O'Neill, &
Rachel Zajac, Addressing the Negative Effect of Cross-Examination Questioning on Children's
Accuracy: Can We Intervene?, 37 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 354, 354 (2013); see also Annie
Cossins, Cross-Examining the Child Complainant: Rights, Innovations and Unfounded Fears
in the Australian Context, in CHILDREN AND CROSs-EXAMINATION: TIME TO CHANGE THE
RULES? 103-104 (2012).
149 See, e.g., Valentine & Mara, supra note 145, at 554.
150 See Zajac & Hayne, supra note 98, at 193 ("[Tlhe well-documented relation between
suggestibility and retention interval is due to the malleability of the underlying representation
that occurs as the original memory trace weakens." (citation omitted)).
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ity "when under pressure or in an intimidating environment."' 5 Stress
and uncertainty produce an overwhelming influence on witnesses, and
many cope by simply changing their story regardless of their original
answers' veracity.1 5 2 Notably, these influences disproportionately affect
vulnerable witnesses, such as victims subjected to sexual assault or
abuse, witnesses with learning difficulties, and children.1 5 3 Put simply,
in many cases, "honest witnesses can be misled by cross-
examination."' 5 4
Moreover, the type of questioning employed on cross-examination
takes advantage of an individual's proclivities towards suggestibility. 55
New information in leading questions can both change witnesses' recol-
lections of an event and cause them to recall things that never hap-
pened.1 5 6 Numerous studies have documented this occurrence-often
referred to as the "misinformation effect."' 5 7 Even small differences in
question wording can lead to this phenomenon. 5 s For example, one
early study found that participants were more likely to erroneously be-
lieve they saw a nonexistent item in a video if exposed to a question that
included a false presupposition or reference to that nonexistent item.' 5 9
Suggestive or constrictive question formatting similarly can cause inac-
curate answers.1 60 Generally, "as questions become more and more spe-
cific responses become less accurate."' 6' Furthermore, when cross-
151 Rachel Zajac & Paula Cannan, Cross-Examination of Sexual Assault Complainants: A
Developmental Comparison, 16 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. S36, S38 (2009).
152 Lauren R. Shapiro et al., Eyewitness Memory for a Simulated Misdemeanor Crime:
The Role of Age and Temperament in Suggestibility, 19 APPL. COGNIT. PSYCHOL. 267, 284-85
(2005); Cossins, supra note 148, at 105; TASLITZ, supra note 130.
153 Valentine & Mara, supra note 145, at 554, 559; Zajac & Hayne, supra note 98, at 193;
Shapiro et al., supra note 152, at 286-87; TASLITZ, supra note 49, at 126.
154 Valentine & Mara, supra note 145, at 559; see also Terrance et al., supra note 146, at
364.
155 Studies have shown that these accuracy-reducing questions occur much more on cross-
examination than they do on direct. See, e.g., Kebbell et al., supra note 145, at 55.
156 BADDELEY supra note 104, at 204-09; Lucy S. McGOUGH, CHILD WITNESSES: FRAG-
ILE VOICES IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 68-70 (1994); Kebbell et al., supra note 145, at
50.
157 See, e.g., Shari R. Berkowitz et al., Pluto Behaving Badly: False Beliefs and Their
Consequences, 121 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 643, 643-46, 655-58 (2008); Elizabeth F. Loftus &
Hunter G. Hoffman, Misinformation and Memory, the Creation of New Memories, J. ExPERI-
MENTAL PSYCHOL. 100, 100-03 (1989); see also Cara Laney & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewit-
ness Testimony and Memory Biases, NOBA, http://nobaproject.com/modules/eyewitness-
testimony-and-memory-biases (last visited Feb. 15, 2017) (gathering and discussing multiple
studies).
158 See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus, Leading Questions and the Eyewitness Report, 7
COGNIT. PSYCHOL. 560, 561-563 (1975).
159 Id. at 566-69 (asking "how fast was the white sports car going when it passed the barn
while traveling along the country road?", as opposed to a variant that contained no reference to
the nonexistent barn) (emphasis added).
160 Kebbell et al., supra note 145, at 50.
161 Id.
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examiners ask witnesses to accede to complex characterizations, uncer-
tain witnesses are more likely to comply than they are to seek clarifica-
tion.162 This is true regardless of whether they understand what the
cross-examiner posited.1 63 The same principle applies to witnesses who
fail to comprehend a question's sentence structure or vocabulary: They
are more likely to agree with the cross-examiner, or attempt some kind of
answer, instead of asking the lawyer to clarify.1 64 "Answers to yes/no
questions may be particularly inaccurate because of acquiescence . . . the
tendency of an individual to answer questions with a 'yes' irrespective of
the content." 65 In short, when witnesses fail to comprehend questions,
they are more likely to give inaccurate answers.
Problems in specific questioning formats are symptomatic of a
larger problem with cross-examination: the danger that the cross-exam-
iner will develop only a carefully crafted narrative at the expense of
broader context and accuracy. Through one formulation or another, all
lawyers know the familiar maxim: never ask a question you do not know
already know the answer to. 16 6 In these situations, advocates may not
pursue information or ask clarifying questions.'67 Curating questions to
constrain the witness's possible responses functions as a corollary to the
rule against unknowns, and when a question causes truncated testimony,
witnesses have very little opportunity to explain.1 68 As a result, underde-
veloped or inaccurate testimony can replace truth. 169 These are not un-
ethical tactics; on the contrary, it is the approach taught in trial-advocacy
textbooks:
Don't let the witness explain. Open-ended questions are
disastrous on cross-examination....
Keep control over the witness. Control comes in large
part by asking precisely phrased leading questions that
never give the witness an opening to hurt you.' 70
162 Zajac & Cannan, supra note 151, at S49; see also Douglass, supra note 96, at 241.
163 Zajac & Cannan, supra note 151, at S49; Ellison, supra note 49, at 356.
164 Ellison, supra note 49, at 354-61.
165 Kebbell et al., supra note 145, at 50 (citation omitted).
166 See, e.g., Robert A. Spanner, The Truth About the Orthodoxy of Cross-Examination,
TRIAL & TECHNOLOGY LAw GROUP, http://www.jurisnotes.com/IP/articles/truthofcrossex-
amination.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2017).
167 Park, supra note 60, at 142-43; Douglass, supra note 96, at 254.
168 Kebbell et al., supra note 145, at 54; Wendy Larcombe, The "Ideal" Victim V Suc-
cessful Rape Complainants: Not What You Might Expect, 10 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 131, 142
(2002).
169 Ellison, supra note 49, at 356-60; see also Epstein, supra note 4, at 437.
170 THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 216 (2d ed. 1988).
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The "dialogue" that occurs between witness and cross-examiner
can, in some cases, morph into an elaborately disguised speech.' 7 ' As
the witness confirms or denies each proposition, the cross-examiner con-
tinues to extract only what he wants, seizing upon any ambiguity to
thread the responses back into his patchwork tale.1 72 If an answer proves
unfavorable or unworkable, counsel still has many options: attack wit-
ness credibility, restyle answers immediately in follow-up questions, or
reformulate the answer later as a characterization of former testimony.' 7 3
Regardless of what the witness says, objections by opposing coun-
sel, or limiting instructions from a judge, the thrust of questions sticks
with factfinders.1 7 4 Most lay factfinders assume cross-examiners have a
strong evidentiary basis for their questions, and skillful cross-examiners
take advantage of this reality.' 75 Take, for example, an inquiry about
whether intoxication limited a witness's perceptive abilities. "Did you
drink any alcohol that day?" may not stand out in the minds of jurors, but
"Didn't you have five shots of tequila at Neighborhood Pub just one hour
prior to the incident?" conveys information apart from the witness's re-
sponse. In longer trials or hearings, factfinders struggle to separate out
"information communicated within the questions from those contained
within the answers." 7 6 Thus, leading, unsubstantiated, or otherwise im-
permissible questions implant erroneous or poorly evidenced claims into
the factfinders' minds, which they later recall as truth.1 77
3. Implications for the College Context
At first glance, it may seem impossible to differentiate between a
suggestible witness and a deceptive one. Has cognitive strain overcome
a deceptive witness or has the cross-examiner preyed on a witness's
suggestibility?
Factfinders' inability to later distinguish testimony from questions
may derive in part from factfinders' preoccupation with demeanor evi-
dence.' 7 During cross-examination, the adversarial system directs
factfinders to dial in with laser-like focus on a witness's reaction as she
171 See Griffin, supra note 6, at 69 ("The witness, after all, is often just a prop during
cross examination, with the examining lawyer providing most of the content.").
172 Douglass, supra note 96, at 255; Taslitz, supra note 49, at 87-88; Zajac et al., supra
note 50, at 19.
173 See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84-88 (1935) (admonishing a United
States prosecutor guilty of similar unethical behavior).
174 Griffin, supra note 104, at 322-23 (noting the ineffectiveness of jury instructions).
175 Saul M. Kassin et al., Dirty Tricks of Cross-Examination: The Influence of Conjec-
tural Evidence on the Jury, 14 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 373, 382 (1990).
176 Id.
177 Richard H. Underwood, The Limits of Cross-Examination, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
113, 124 (1997); Kassin et al., supra note 175, at 374-75, 380.
178 See supra Part II.A.I.
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responds.' 7 9 As factfinders futilely attempt to suss out witness credibil-
ity through unreliable demeanor evidence, factfinders lose the ability to
analyze the cross-examiner's tricks and illusions. 8 0 The possibility that
abusive or intimidating questions will evoke a witness response that
factfinders equivocate with a lack of credibility further compounds these
errors.18 1
Depending on the format, shielding or questioning by an intermedi-
ary could obviate many of the problems caused by the current presenta-
tion of demeanor evidence.18 2 By preventing factfinders from focusing
on unreliable visual demeanor cues, shielding refocuses the factfinders
on the evidence being presented, and its internal logic consistency.18 3 In
addition, technological screening, or presenting intermediary questioning
in video format, may strengthen the reliability of paraverbal-demeanor
evidence-the behavioral cues that might be accurately associated with
deception.18 4 Sophisticated recording equipment can register small
changes in the witness's pitch or tone that the naked human ear normally
cannot perceive.'8 5 Thus, depending on format, shielding could dampen
inclinations to depend on misleading demeanor evidence while simulta-
neously achieving the heretofore-elusive goal of enabling reliable de-
meanor judgments based on paraverbal cues.
Opponents of shielding balk at the idea of removing face-to-face
interaction between the victim and the accused.18 6 Many believe that
witnesses will have a harder time lying if they come face-to-face with the
accused, or have to look into the eyes of a jury or judge.' 8 7 Researchers
179 Levenson, supra note 87, at 574-76; see also supra Part II.A.I.
180 Ellison, supra note 49, at 361.
181 Id.
182 Blumenthal, supra note 68, at 1202; Gwyneth Doherty-Sneddon & Sandra McAuley,
Influence of Video-Mediation on Adult-Child Interviews: Implication for the Use of Live Link
with Child Witnesses, 14 APPL. COGNIT. PSYCHOL. 379, 380-81, 391 (2000); see also Land-
strim et al., supra note 82, at 928.
183 See supra Part II.A.1; Lyn M. Van Swol & Michael T. Braun, Channel Choice, Justifi-
cation of Deception, and Detection, 64 J. COMM. 1139, 1140, 1154 (2014); Blumenthal, supra
note 68, at 1202.
184 See supra Part II.Al.
185 See id.; Sporer & Schwandt, supra note 68, at 443. The ability to play video in slow
motion may also lead to observers being able to detect deception more reliably through visual
cues. See GRANHAG, VRIJ & VERSCHUERE, supra note 61, at 317.
186 Marc C. McAllister, The Disguised Witness and Crawford's Uneasy Tension with
Craig: Bringing Uniformity to the Supreme Court's Confrontation Jurisprudence, 58 DRAKE
L. REV. 481, 526-27 (2010).
187 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019
(1988); Marc C. McAllister, The Disguised Witness and Crawford's Uneasy Tension with
Craig: Bringing Uniformity to the Supreme Court's Confrontation Jurisprudence, 58 DRAKE
L. REV. 481, 526-27 (2010); Todd E. Pettys, Counsel and Confrontation, 94 MINN. L. REV.
201, 221-22 (2009). This is despite evidence that some of earliest proponents of cross-exami-
nation, such as Wigmore, viewed this assumption as tenuous. Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1645.
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refer to this theory as the "Social Distance Hypothesis"-i.e., that "peo-
ple are uncomfortable about engaging in deception and prefer more so-
cial distance from the receiver when they deceive."'"" For obvious
reasons, this assumption evades empirical research.'8 9 Nonetheless,
shielding witnesses from the panel still may improve accuracy by
preventing factfinders from focusing on unreliable visual demeanor cues
and refocusing their attention on the evidence being presented, the way
questions are being asked, and the testimony's internal logic consis-
tency.19 0 For example, studies comparing live-video or videotaped testi-
mony to traditional live-testimony formats show no significant
differences across mediums in observers' ability to detect deception.191
This procedural innovation aside, any move towards or away from
cross-examination remains an imprecise balancing act. Many practition-
ers assume that redirect cures misleading cross, just as careful cross-ex-
amination corrects a misleading direct. If cross-examination can uncover
or undermine truth, then good advocacy and control of unethical behav-
ior may be the answer. However, another option remains: attacking what
causes misinformation.
Panel-submission-only questioning succeeds in some respects by re-
moving the opportunity for the cross-examiner to exploit witness sug-
gestibility or restrict witness testimony.1 9 2 Because the panel controls
the form and delivery of the questions, each response can be fully con-
textualized. But the panel-submission-only procedure insulates wit-
nesses from unanticipated questions and follow-up questions.1 9 3
Submitting questions before the hearing cannot replicate cross-examina-
tion; even the most skilled advocate cannot chart sub-questions for each
question, and sub-questions for those sub-questions, before the witness
188 Van Swol & Braun, supra note 183, at 1140.
189 Researchers in some studies have found that when people have a choice they prefer to
lie through other mediums such as text-chat or telephone as opposed to face-to-face lies. See,
e.g., id. at 1152; Bella M. DePaulo et al., Lying in Everyday Life, 70 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 979, 980, 985, 992 (1996). However, these results are not uniform and others have
found that people prefer face-to-face deception to other modes of deception. Van Swol &
Braun, supra note 183, at 1154; Jeffery T. Hancock et al., Deception and Design: The Impact
of Communication Technology on Lying Behavior, 6 CHI 2004 130, 133-34 (2004) (finding
more lies in face-to-face interaction than in email).
190 Blumenthal, supra note 68, at 1202; Doherty-Sneddon & McAuley, supra note 182, at
391; Van Swol & Braun, supra note 183, at 1140, 1154; see also Landstrom et al., supra note
82, at 928.
191 See, e.g., Landstr6m et al., supra note 66, at 344; Lederer, supra note 48, at 21; Craig,
497 U.S. at 850; see also Landstrom et al., supra note 82, at 927 (noting that both live and
video observers were poor in terms of assessing veracity"); Kenniston, supra note 48, at 119.
192 Particularly concerning effects in the context of sexual-assault victims.
193 See Sanchirico, supra note 132, at 521-23 (explaining how live questioning differs);
Park, supra note 60, at 149 (explaining how a neutral questioner cannot achieve the same end
of drawing out inconsistent statements from the witness as cross-examination does).
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begins to answer.1 94 This monumental task becomes nearly impossible
when one considers the accused's limited investigatory power prior to
the hearing. 95 Colleges intentionally design the investigation and adju-
dication process to separate the accused from the complainant.1 96 Be-
cause of this and related restrictions, the accused may not know the
majority of questions to ask until the complainant and other witnesses
begin testifying; the hearing may be the only time the accused has to
investigate, probe, and test the credibility of witnesses. 9 7
Questioning by intermediaries provides some-though of course not
all-of cross-examination's truth-seeking benefits.1 98 Funneling ques-
tions through an intermediary hampers the cognitive-load technique by
interrupting cross-examination's taxing tempo. Inconsistencies arise
when deceptive witnesses must quickly process questions and perform
the attendant tasks required to maintain a coherent narrative.' 99 The in-
termediary process slows down questioning because of the delay be-
tween when the accused suggests the question, and when the
intermediary formulates the question; 200 cognitive strain decreases as the
time between questions lengthens. 20 1 In some cases, the intervening time
could be enough for witnesses to conform their lies to questioning.
But through the intermediary process, the accused can still ask un-
anticipated follow-up questions that expose witness deception or error,
and, as intermediaries gain knowledge and skill from repeat practice, the
gap between question formulation and presentation will narrow. Like-
wise, control of question pacing and delivery by the intermediary may
enhance the hearing's accuracy in other ways.202 Unlike an advocate
with an agenda, intermediaries ensure that the witness answers the ques-
tion in its full context. 203 This weakens the ability of the cross-examiner
to prey on suggestibility through narrowly framed, or confusingly
worded questioning. 204 Moreover, the accused cannot covertly expose
the factfinder to impermissible suggestions and unfairly prejudicial infor-
mation. Because the intermediary is censoring questions-instead of the
194 See Sanchirico, supra note 132, at 521-23 (describing how live testimony is the only
way to achieve the benefits from closed-loop questioning); see also Sanchiico, supra note 81,
at 336; TERENCE F. MACCARTHY, MACCARTHY ON CRos-EXAMINATION 73-76 (2007).
195 See Triplett, supra note 18, at 523-25 (noting the discovery limits placed on the
accused).
196 Baker, supra note 15, at 272.
197 Triplett, supra note 18, at 521-22.
198 TASLITz, supra note 49, at 131; Kenniston, supra note 48, at 111.
199 See supra Part II.A.2.
200 See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Remote Testimony, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 695, 702
(2002) (noting the time-lag with technology).
201 See supra Part II.A.2; Ellison, supra note 49, at 364.
202 TASLITz, supra note 49, at 129; Ellison, supra note 49, at 364-65.
203 Ellison, supra note 49, at 364-65.
204 See id.
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factfinder ruling on objections-there would be less opportunity for the
factfinder to wrongly remember impermissible questions as evidence.
However, questioning by an intermediary takes more time and results in
more questioning than panel-submission-only questioning. Opponents of
introducing any form of cross-examination into the college context worry
that this additional questioning adds more opportunities for factfinders to
unfairly discount the victim's account; there is always the risk that an
honest witness's failure to recall inconsequential details, or her inability
to maintain complete consistency, will unfairly prejudice factfinders
against her. 2 0 5 While empirical evidence can get reformers closer to ex-
amining the right factors, it cannot precisely weigh how much truth a
procedure produces in each individual hearing.
B. Procedural Fairness
A separate set of rationales for cross-examination sounds in a prin-
ciple still more difficult to measure: fairness. When the reality of un-
known and indeterminate values confronts reformers, advocates of any
procedure often resort to arguments about fairness. 206 Like the assump-
tion that questioning through cross-examination enhances accuracy,
cross-examination has also been thought to improve a hearing's fairness
by respecting the accused's procedural rights. 20 7 However, because
criminal prosecutions juxtapose the accused to the State, how "fair" a
procedure is to the victim was an overlooked consideration for much of
the American adversarial system's history. While changes to rules of
evidence have recently began responding to these concerns, 2 0 8 advocates
of the college adjudication system openly admit that the movement rep-
resents a direct reaction to what its proponents saw as a failure to prop-
erly consider the fairness of requiring a victim to undergo a criminal trial
with its attendant procedures-foremost among their concerns being a
grueling cross-examination. Unfortunately, attempts to reify procedural
fairness and balance the rights of the accused against accuser result in an
even more frustrating lack of concrete answers. Yet, reformers can have
a more productive conversation about weighing these values against one
another without resorting to all-or-nothing rhetoric. In an attempt to
frame that discussion, this section begins the arduous task of drilling
down to what advocates and reformers mean when they speak of
fairness.
205 See Gary L. Wells & Michael R. Leippe, How Do Triers of Fact Infer the Accuracy of
Eyewitness Identifications? Using Memory for Peripheral Detail Can Be Misleading, 66 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 682, 684-86 (1981).
206 See Raymond LaMagna, (Re)constitutionalizing Confrontation: Reexamining Un-
availability and the Value of Live Testimony, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 1499, 1505-6 (2006).
207 See id.
208 See id. at 1538 n.295.
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1. Fairness to the Accused
Beyond determining the "truth" of what happened, the American
judicial system places a premium on providing a "fair" process. 2 0 9 Dis-
putes will always be unfair in the sense that resource asymmetries be-
tween the parties exist. Someone accused of sexual assault may never
have the investigatory resources of a government prosecutor or college.
But increasing procedural rights and options has been the American judi-
cial system's preferred counteraction. 2 10 At the most basic level, our ju-
dicial system considers a process "more fair" when each side has the
same procedural opportunities. 2 11 Allowing both parties the same oppor-
tunity to develop evidence and question witnesses through cross-exami-
nation moves a trial or hearing closer to that ideal of procedural
fairness. 212
The triumph of this ideal of procedural fairness in the American
legal system has followed largely from an aversion to the inquisitorial
model of adjudication, and a belief that moving adjudications away from
an inquisitorial format achieves fairness by inching the parties closer to
procedural parity.2 13 And while there may not actually be a pure inquisi-
torial or adversarial model in existence, our judicial system and constitu-
tional law jurisprudence have selected cross-examination as the best
legal innovation for approximating perfect procedural parity. 2 14 The
ability of the accused to participate in the proceedings against him pre-
vents the accused from becoming merely the subject of a trial where
inquisitors determine his fate. Similarly, endeavoring for procedural par-
ity between adversaries increases institutional legitimacy in the eyes of
the accused and society, which some maintain is a value in and of
itself.2 15
209 See Raymond LaMagna, (Re)constitutionalizing Confrontation: Reexamining Un-
availability and the Value of Live Testimony, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 1499, 1505 (2006).
210 See Barbara Allen Babcock, Introduction: Taking the Stand, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1, 1 (1993) ("[W]ith our deep cultural distaste for mismatches, we seek to balance the odds at
trial by shoring up the accused, giving him independence and autonomy, rights and options.").
211 See Robert P. Mosteller, The Sixth Amendment Rights to Fairness: The Touchstones of
Effectiveness and Pragmatism, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 28 (2012) ("[Fairness means] fair
procedure to all as a value separate from the impact on accuracy (or innocence)."); Sklansky,
supra note 52, at 105, 109; see also Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face
Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 863, 902 (1988) ("[A fair] procedure should allow those
affected to participate meaningfully, personally, and on equal footing with their adversary.").
212 See Lempert, supra note 6, at 353 ("[Truth is supposed to be a product of fair process.
Rules should be fairly read and applied neutrally. Language should not change in meaning,
depending on which side is helped and whether that side's case is more likely to be true.").
213 See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004); Sklansky, supra note 4, at
1644-45.
214 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50; Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1644-45.
215 See Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause, 92 B.U. L. REV.
1865, 1904 (2012).
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These assumptions have cemented cross-examination into the
American ideal of procedural fairness. But again, the primacy of this
ideal and cross-examination's assumed ability to approximate it are as-
sumptions rarely subjected to critical examination. A useful inquiry-
both with regard to sexual-assault adjudications and in the broader trial-
system context-is to examine what elements of the accused's participa-
tion actually make a process fairer.
The aforementioned struggle of obtaining truly "accurate" outcomes
forms part of the reason for valuing the accused's participation. Cross-
examination accepts the reality of trial, a process more akin to story-
telling than science. "Truth" is an elusive a concept. Trials cannot re-
create the past, but instead must settle on an imperfect version of it.216
"Many social scientists who study juries have concluded that they inter-
pret information not by considering and weighing each relevant piece of
evidence in turn, but by constructing competing narratives and then de-
ciding which story is more persuasive." 2 17 Thus, "the trial is won by the
most elegant story, the one that accounts for the facts in the most mean-
ingful way, the one with the most explanatory power, the one that speaks
best to the jury in the most familiar terms." 2 18
As the first mover, the prosecution or plaintiff has a significant ad-
vantage. 2 19 "Experiments show that the first piece of evidence or argu-
ment presented to a jury wields the greatest influence on both its
interpretation of evidence and which story the jury deems most believa-
ble." 2 2 0 In particular, jurors remember this first narrative better, down-
play its inconsistencies, and funnel all future information through its
construct. 22 1 With such asymmetries, a fair trial requires that the accused
play some role in shaping the initial narrative. To some degree, this Arti-
cle's discussion of accuracy has already noted the procedural fairness
value in cross-examination: its ability to expose errors and contextualize
evidence. 222
But the act of cross-examination itself adds to a trial or hearing's
procedural fairness in yet another way because it constitutes a par-
216 See Griffin, supra note 104, at 293 ("[R]esearch has yielded the insight that jurors do
not, by and large, estimate probabilities when determining the events that transpired in a case;
rather, they draw conclusions based on whether information assembles into plausible
narratives.").
217 Id. at 285.
218 STEVEN LUBET, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE WHOLE TRUTH 186 (2002); Griffin, supra
note 104, at 293-94.
219 Kimberlianne Podlas, Impact of Television on Cross-Examination and Juror "Truth
14 WIDENER L. REV. 479, 483-84 (2009).
220 Id. at 483 (footnotes omitted); Katheleen Carrese Gerbasi et al., Justice Needs a New
Blindfold: A Review of Mock Jury Research, 84 PSYCHOL. BULL. 323, 337-39 (1977).
221 Podlas, supra note 219, at 484-85 (footnotes omitted).
222 See supra Part II.A.2.
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ticipatory right. 2 2 3 Its performative nature injects the accused and his
narrative into the proceeding, according him "a degree of dignity, al-
lowing him some agency in the adjudication process and treating his in-
put and his objections as worthy of respect." 224 This prevents not only
inaccurate results, but also results reached without consideration of a dis-
pute's human element.2 25 Without cross-examination, factfinders evalu-
ate evidence created and tailored outside the trial, by unquestioned
investigators and well-prepped witnesses. 226 By juxtaposing the initial
narrative with the accused's, cross-examination reminds factfinders "not
only that there are two stories to tell about most events, but also that
there is always a discontinuity between any event and even the best tell-
ing of it. Cross-examination helps put the jury on the road to a truth
beyond storytelling." 2 2 7 When the accused confronts his accusers,
factfinders must confront the fact that their decision will affect both the
humanity of the victim and the accused. 228 The procedural benefits of
humanizing the accused are difficult to quantify, but they constitute an
important additional consideration when trying to achieve a fair process.
The value of these benefits derives from cross-examination's ability to
transform the accused from subject to active participant, commanding
consideration-if not vindication-for his narrative.
2. Fairness to the Victim
But his narrative is not the only narrative that deserves considera-
tion. Although cross-examination confers procedural benefits on the ac-
cused, those advantages come with costs. For instance, the cross-
examiner may focus on conveying his narrative to the detriment of a
more complete and accurate one. 229 Relatedly, probing questioning is
not particularly kind to the witness. At its worst, some cross-examina-
223 BURNS, supra note 93, at 122 (discussing the benefits of oral and dramatic
presentation).
224 Sklansky, supra note 1, at 67; Griffin, supra note 6, at 65; Richard D. Friedman, The
Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed, CATO SuP. CT. REV. 439, 442 (2004).
225 Sklansky, supra note 4, at 1691-92.
226 See LaMagna, supra note 209, at 1503-05 (discussing the procedural value of live
testimony).
227 BURNS, supra note 93, at 17.
228 See Babcock, supra note 210, at 6 (noting that "the natural order of the trail
dehumanizes").
229 Of course, this is a criticism that could be leveled against the adversary system as a
whole. Opening statements, direct examinations, closing statements, and so on, all focus on a
specific party's narrative. But prevalence is not a valid defense to criticism. If narrative-
myopia frustrates the accuracy and fairness goals of a judicial system, reformers should con-
sider changes to individual procedures. At the very least, reformers should recognize that the
status quo perpetuates a declared preference for both parties to have an equal opportunity at
obscuring the truth over other values; i.e., having all stages affected by this flaw is preferable
to having one stage where the strategic advantage is mitigated in favor of accuracy or fairness
goals.
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tions have served no purpose other than to intimidate or abuse. And
abusive questioning causes harm apart from polluting the accuracy of
individual trials. These questions harm testifying witness. The most
able judge cannot protect a witness from all the negative aspects of a
grueling cross-examination, and the traumatic experience of cross-exami-
nation falls hardest on testifying victims. This negative aspect of cross-
examination comes with a diverse range of consequences not only for
individual victims, but also for society as a whole. If abusive question-
ing occurs on a systemic basis-as many suggest it does in sexual-assault
and rape cases-groups of people refuse to cooperate with the judicial
system. Without their participation and cooperation, the judicial system
cannot punish and deter wrongdoing, and it will have a harder time de-
veloping reform to encourage participation and cooperation. But like as-
sumptions about cross-examination's benefits, these conclusions require
a little more unpacking.
To begin, some questions do not advance a truth-seeking function at
all, but instead serve only to embarrass or abuse.230 Testifying often en-
tails a deep dive into private aspects of a witness's life. 2 3 1 Evidentiary
rules may limit some questions, 2 3 2 but this does not stop many cross-
examiners from asking questions about impermissible topics. 2 3 3 Like-
wise, creative cross-examiners can devise subtle subterfuge to elicit the
same information or make the same insinuations through permissible
questioning. 2 34 In most trials and hearings, non-party witnesses are not
represented by counsel and thus are powerless against repeated attacks
from the cross-examiner if the non-questioning advocate does not ob-
ject. 2 3 5 Even if an advocate objects, impermissible and unnecessary
questions still negatively affect the witness.
Many of these harms fall disproportionately hardest on those whom
the judicial system aims to protect-victims.2 3 6 In most trials, adjudica-
230 See, e.g., Park, supra note 60, at 163-64; Ellison, supra note 49, at 360-61.
231 Lininger, supra note 5, at 1354-55.
232 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403, 412; see also Aviva Orenstein, Special Issues Raised by
Rape Trials, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1598 (2007) (discussing rape-shield laws).
233 TASLITZ, supra note 49, at 84-85.
234 Id.; Mary Fan, Adversarial Justice's Casualties: Defending Victim- Witness Protection,
55 B.C. L. REV. 775, 787 (2014).
235 See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 5, at 1358, 1362; TASLITz, supra note 49, at 93-97.
236 It is pertinent to pause and distinguish victims and complainants. Protecting the
psyche of a wrongful or mistaken accuser does not outweigh the costs of a wrongful accusa-
tion. A wrongly accused defendant obviously suffers considerable trauma from arrest through
trial. If convicted, society punishes a wrongly accused defendant for a crime he did not com-
mit. And collateral consequences such as loss of reputation follow even from an acquittal. If
adjudicatory systems are supposed to determine whether a wrong occurred, society cannot
really sort the victims from wrongful or mistaken accusers until after the fact. But just because
society cannot conclusively categorize whether there was a true "victim" in an individual case
does not mean that observations about the aggregate harm to victims cannot be made. The
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tors have difficulty differentiating abusive and repetitive questioning
from questioning relevant to fact-finding and credibility. Take a cross-
examination of a rape victim, revolving around questions of consent:
The lawyer must grill the victim about the details of
her behavior, attitudes and attire on the night of the at-
tack-feigning regret, perhaps, that circumstances com-
pel the lawyer to be so graphic. The lawyer must
characterize every detail vividly from the most salacious
point of view attainable and present it all with maximum
innuendo. Had she been drinking? Had she told the de-
fendant some dirty jokes before they left the bar? Was
she wearing a sexy tank top? Had she brushed her hand
against the defendant's, or allowed him to kiss her? Did
she resist when he lifted her skirt? Did she respond
while the defendant was inside her? To make it seem
plausible that the victim consented and then turned
around and charged rape, the lawyer must play to the
jurors' deeply rooted cultural fantasies about feminine
sexual voracity and vengefulness. All the while, without
seeming like a bully, the advocate must humiliate and
browbeat the prosecutrix, knowing that if she blows up
she will seem less sympathetic, while if she pulls inside
herself emotionally she loses credibility as a victim. 2 3 7
It is understandable why many see cross-examination as a vehicle to "try
the victim," 2 38 when adjudicators fail to limit questioning like this.
Harm to the victim follows naturally from this type of questioning,
especially in abuse, sexual-assault, and rape cases. Unlimited and prob-
ing cross-examination causes mental and physical239 distress during the
trial, and can exacerbate the psychological harm a victim suffers after the
discussion does not take an absolute position on what risks our system should preference over
others, or what procedures should be used to effectuate those preferences. Rather, this section
only chronicles the observable and empirical costs current cross-examination procedures im-
pose on victims.
237 David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relation-
ship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1028 (1990); see also Eleanor W.
Myers & Edward D. Ohlbaum, Discrediting the Truthful Witness: Demonstrating the Reality
ofAdversary Advocacy, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1055, 1060-61, 1066-68 (2000) (giving another
example).
238 LANGBEIN, supra note 54, at 295-96; Jonathan M. Golding et al., Impeaching Rape
Victims in Criminal Court: Does Concurrent Civil Action Hurt Justice?,J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 1, 3 (2015).
239 For example, some witnesses report feeling "physically nauseated" when undergoing
cross-examination. Amanda Konradi, Too Little, Too Late: Prosecutors' Pre-court Prepara-
tion of Rape Survivors, 22 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 41 (1997).
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trial. 24 0 Even before trial, victims of abuse, sexual assault, or rape are
already so traumatized by the crime that they may well suffer lasting
psychological problems. 2 4 1 At trial, the victim must undergo that trauma
again when she recounts her experience in court.242 In an attempt to
exculpate the accused, many advocates tap into factfinders' preexisting
beliefs and stereotypes about what "real" assault, abuse, or rape looks
like. 2 4 3 "Did you fight or resist him?" "What did you say to him during
sex?" "Why didn't you go to the police right after?" "Did you continue
your relationship with him after the event?" And so on. 2 44 These narra-
tives reinforce oppressive social norms and leave many victims feeling
partially responsible for the harm done to them. 2 4 5
The desire to discredit witnesses intertwines these problems with
cross-examination. Direct attacks on the witness's credibility are not un-
common during the victim's recounting:
"That is simply not true . . ."
"You are indulging in the realms of fantasy . .
"Utter fantasy is it not?"
"This is a lie . .
240 Golding et al., supra note 238, at 3; Zajac & Cannan, supra note 151, at S38; Fan,
supra note 234, at 786-87; Ellison, supra note 49, at 360; Lininger, supra note 5, at 1355;
TASLITZ, supra note 49, at 11l; Patricia Yancey Martin & R. Marlene Powell, Accounting for
the "Second Assault": Legal Organizations' Framing of Rape Victims, 19 L. & Soc. INQUIRY
853, 856 (1994).
241 Jessica McCarrick et al., Men's Experience of the Criminal Justice System Following
Female Perpetrated Intimate Partner Violence, 31 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 203, 204 (2016); Jana
Robinson, The Experience of the Child Witness: Legal and Psychological Issues, 42-43 INT'L
J. oF L. & PSYCHIATRY 168, 173-74 (2015); Sarah M. Guerette & Sandra L. Caron, Assessing
the Impact of Acquaintance Rape: Interviews with Women Who Are Victims/Survivors of Sex-
ual Assault While in College, 22(2) J. OF C. STUDENT PSYCHOTHERAPY 31, 33, 42-44 (2007).
242 Tracey A. Berry, Prior Untruthful Allegations Under Wisconsin's Rape Shield Law:
Will Those Words Come Back to Haunt You?, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 1237, 1245 (2002); National
Crime Victim Law Institute, Allowing Adult Sexual Assault Victims to Testify at Trial via Live
Video Technology, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN BULL. 1, 1-2 & nn.15-18 (Sept. 2011).
243 SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM VICTIMIZES WOMEN WHO SAY
No 1-7 (1987); TASLITZ, supra note 49, at 8-9, 17-19, 38-41, 43, 106; Kellie Rose Lynch et
al., Who Bought the Drinks? Juror Perceptions of Intoxication in a Rape Trial, 28(16)
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3205, 3206-07, 3216-18 (2013); Michelle J. Anderson, Women
Do Not Report the Violence They Suffer: Violence Against Women and the State Action Doc-
trine, 46 VILL. L. REV. 907, 936 (2001); see also McCarrick et al., supra note 241, at 204, 211
(detailing how gender biases affect male victims of domestic violence in the legal system).
244 Rebecca Campbell, The Psychological Impact of Rape Victims' Experience with the
Legal, Medical, and Mental Health Systems, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 702, 704 (2008); see also
Paul Peirce, Suspended Mt. Pleasant Officer Ordered to Trial in Attempted Rape Case, TRIB
LIVE, Apr. 8, 2016, http://triblive.com/news/westmoreland/10275970-74/brown-woman-
assault.
245 Fan, supra note 234, at 786-87; TASLITZ, supra note 49, at 84-85.
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"What you have told this jury is a complete pack of
lies . . ."246
If the accused is not punished, the victim experiences psychological
harm resulting from fear, doubt, and regret that she endured a futile pro-
cess. 2 4 7 Even when a favorable outcome occurs, the trauma inflicted by
the trial can contribute to lasting psychological injury. 248
Furthermore, abusive questioning impoverishes the entire judicial
system. Witnesses who fear abusive cross-examination often entirely
avoid judicial systems. 249 Adjudications either do not begin or falter for
lack of evidence. This immunizes individual instances of wrongdoing
from justice. 250 Likewise, without these cases, the system has no oppor-
tunity to deter specific wrongdoers and has fewer occasions to deter the
community more generally. 251
Moreover, because "[1]egal processes not only reflect, but also cre-
ate, familiar narratives," 2 5 2 diverse perspectives are key. Take the recent
highly publicized case of Brock Turner, a former Stanford University
athlete convicted of sexually assaulting an unconscious woman. 253 Al-
though prosecutions of college athletes for sexual assault occasionally
make the news, the firestorm of media coverage surrounding this story
seemed atypical. This one case from Santa Clara County, California
sparked national debates about procedures in sexual-assault prosecutions,
sentencing practices, and how colleges handle sexual-assault
246 Amelia Gentleman, Prosecuting Sexual Assault: 'Raped All Over Again,' THE GUARD-
IAN (Apr. 13, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/apr/13/rape-sexual-assault-
frances-andrade-court (quoting cross-examination of a victim from a sexual assault trial in the
United Kingdom where the victim committed suicide days after trial).
247 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 241, at 174; Campbell, supra note 244, at 703.
248 Researches cannot completely isolate the trial process from other influences on psy-
chological well being, but most agree that the trial process has this detrimental effect. Golding
et al., supra note 238, at 3; Fan, supra note 234, at 784-88; Nat'I Crime Victim Law Inst.,
supra note 242, at 1-2 & n. 15; Campbell, supra note 244, at 704-05; Larcombe, supra note
168, at 132 & n.2; see also Martin & Powell, supra note 240, at 856 ("Some research indi-
cates, furthermore, that prosecution per se harms victims.").
249 See Lininger, supra note 5, at 1357 ("As a general matter, victims' willingness to
report crimes varies inversely with their fear of embarrassment during cross-examination.");
Anderson, supra note 243, at 936-37 (citing studies supporting the proposition for victims of
sexual assault and rape); Park, supra note 60, at 164; Konradi, supra note 239, at 47-48.
250 Fan, supra note 234, at 787-88; Triplett, supra note 18, at 514.
251 See, e.g., Martin D. Schwartz & Walter S. DeKeseredy, Sexual Assault on the College
Campus: The Role of Male Peer Support 159-61 (1997) (discussing the role of campus disci-
plinary proceedings in deterring sexual assault).
252 Griffin, supra note 104, at 290-91.
253 A.J. Perez, Brock Turner Leaves Jail After Serving 3 Months For Sexual Assault, USA
TODAY (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2016/09/02/brock-tumer
-released-jail-sexual-assault/89762896/; Ashley Fantz, Outrage Over 6-Month Sentence for
Brock Turner in Stanford Rape Case, CNN (June 7, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/06/
us/sexual-assault-brock-tumer-stanford/.
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problems, 254 even prompting former Vice President Joe Biden to weigh
in on the handling of the case. 25 5 And this media attention has generated
concrete political efforts for change. 256 Beyond efforts to alter California
laws, 2 5 7 many citizens are exploring the possibility of recalling the judge
in the case. 2 58 Stanford allocated $2.7 million of its budget towards sex-
ual-assault-prevention-and-response programs. 2 5 9 Although many fac-
tors may have contributed to this story becoming national news, one
particular circumstance seems to have been the catalyst: the victim's de-
cision to participate in the trial and read a 12-page letter in open court
describing her experience before the judge sentenced the defendant. 2 6 0
As one commentator put it, the victim's "statement has brought more
attention to rape culture than any single indictment or verdict could." 2 6 1
Society paused and considered how it was handling the problem of sex-
ual assault because of one victim's statements. Her perspective had an
invaluable impact on the national narratives surrounding reform.
Conversely, when groups of people refuse to turn to legal processes,
narratives form without their perspectives. Thus, the harm continues in a
vicious cycle. The inefficiencies of the system-failing in its duties to
protect witnesses, to eviscerate destructive social narratives, and to pun-
ish wrongdoers-deter witnesses from turning to it. Without these wit-
nesses' perspectives, beneficial legal and social reforms to these
254 Perez, supra note 253; Fantz, supra note 253.
255 Tom Namako, Joe Biden Writes an Open Letter to Stanford Survivor, BUZZFEED (June
9, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com/tomnamako/joe-biden-writes-an-open-letter-to-stanford-
survivor?utmterm=.qfzX4QBX6#.ueXga3jgo.
256 See, e.g., Peyton Carper, President Obama Just Passed a Revolutionary Sexual As-
sault Bill, ULOOP (Oct. 8, 2016), http://www.uloop.com/news/view.php/216613/President-
Obama-Just-Passed-A-Revolutionary-Sexual-Assault-Bill.
257 CAL. PENAL § 1203.065 (2016); Mollie Reilly, California Closes Loophole That Al-
lowed Brock Turner's Light Sentence, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 2016), http://
www.huffingtonpost.comlentry/california-rape-sentencing-brock-turner-us_57c6f0a9e4b07
8581f10631c.
258 Reilly, supra note 257; Fantz, supra note 253; Liam Stack, Judge Aaron Persky Under
Fire For Sentencing in Stanford Rape Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/201 6/06/08/us/judge-in-stanford-rape-case-is-being-threatened-who-is-
aaron-persky.html. The judge was also recently removed from another sexual-assault case, a
powerful message considering the high bar required for such an action. Susan Svrluga, Judge
Who Issued Controversial Sentence in Stanford Trial Removed From a New Sexual Assault
Case, WASH. POST: GRADE POINT (June 14, 2016), http://wpo.st/Sea62.
259 Veronica Rocha, "Look at Him. He Wont Survive It": Brock Turner's Mom Begged
Judge Not to Put Him in Prison, L.A. TIMES (June 13, 2016), http://www.latimes.conlocal/
lanow/la-me-In-brock-turner-mother-prison-20160613-snap-story.html.
260 Fantz, supra note 253. The trial and its surrounding narrative only became the center
of a national debate after the victim's letter went viral on the Internet. See, e.g., Kate
Geiselman, In Brock Turner's Home Town, We're Raising Kids Who Are Never Told "No",
WASH. POST: POSTEVERYTHING (June 8, 2016), http://wpo.st/rea62.
261 Geiselman, supra note 260.
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inefficiencies become less likely. 2 6 2 The participatory rights of victims
should be considered if our legal system truly ascribes a fairness value to
participatory parity.
3. Implications for the College Context
The panel-submission-only approach to questioning in college sex-
ual-assault adjudications is a reaction to what victim's rights advocates
saw as an institutional disregard of the victim's procedural participatory
rights. In their view, panel-submission-only questioning lessens victims'
suffering and reduces impediments to adjudication of meritorious
complaints.
In many cases, this belief may prove true. As the accused's partici-
pation in the process declines, the trauma a complainant experiences
while testifying wanes. 26 3 Even the most attentive arbiters cannot censor
all abusive questions, so by allowing a panel to censor or change ques-
tions ex ante, this process has the capacity to preclude abusive question-
ing altogether. 2 6 4 Furthermore, the questions come from a neutral panel,
as opposed to antagonistic parties like the accused or his counsel.265 The
panel can also control the length of the proceeding by circumscribing the
scope of the inquiry, protecting victims from ill-defined or excessively
long proceedings. 266
Moreover, the panel-submission-only procedure enhances an insti-
tution's ability to encourage reporting. Victims are less likely to report
sexual assaults as procedures become more akin to a courtroom proceed-
ing, 2 6 7 and some evidence suggests that fear of cross-examination may
be the primary driving force behind underreporting in the criminal-jus-
tice system. 268 College adjudications likely are encouraging victims to
come forward in greater numbers.
But the procedural-fairness pendulum may have swung too far, too
fast. The panel-submission-only procedure all but eliminates the ac-
cused's opportunity for procedural participation. Participation in these
cases becomes all the more necessary because the hearing's resolution
262 TASLITZ, supra note 49, at 155; I. Bennett Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA
L. REV. 826, 866 (2013) (noting studies that suggest destructive social narratives affect juror
decision-making); Anne M. Coughlin, Interrogation Stories, 95 VA. L. REv. 1600, 1607
(2009) ("[T]he ultimate objective is not merely to remove victim-blaming stories from the
courtroom, but to purge them from the popular stockpile as well . . ."); see also Griffin, supra
note 104, at 334-35 (noting the importance of trials in legal and social reform).
263 Nat'Il Crime Victim Law Inst., supra note 235, at 1-2 & n.15.
264 TASLITz, supra note 49, at 118-120.
265 See supra Part II.A.2.
266 See Triplett, supra note 18, at 514 (discussing the chilling effect of victim testimony
that occurs when college proceedings are delayed or prolonged).
267 Baker, supra note 15, at 270-71; see Fan, supra note 234, at 788.
268 See supra note 249.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
often depends on weighing the victim's credibility against the accused's
credibility. 2 6 9 In the vast majority of cases, no one else witnesses the act
and no other evidence exists. 270 One witness's isolated testimony forms
the core of the case against the accused. Although uncommon, false re-
porting does occur.27 1 In the immediate aftermath of an unfavorable ad-
judication, the accused faces suspension or expulsion. 272 A negative
finding goes on a student's record and adversely affects future educa-
tional and professional opportunities. 2 7 3 These hearings may not directly
result in convictions or civil liability, but in many cases, they serve as
evidence in future trials. 2 7 4 That these results flow from the panel's eval-
uation of a swearing contest amplifies the necessity of procedural partici-
pation to a fair hearing. 2 75 Eliminating this participation limits the
fairness of the instant adjudication and future ones. 2 7 6
The gravity of these hearings, combined with the centrality of wit-
ness testimony, elevates the need for some form of cross-examination. 2 7 7
Shielding and the intermediary method each provide some protection to
the victim without eviscerating the accused's procedural participation,
and add fairness value on their own.
Shielding mitigates the suffering a victim experiences when con-
fronting the accused face-to-face. 2 7 8 These benefits to the complainant
may collaterally improve the accuracy of the hearing. Victims of physi-
cal and sexual abuse often do not, or cannot, testify in the presence of the
accused abuser.279 By excluding this obstacle, shielding facilitates testi-
269 Baker, infra note 298, at 23; see also Sanchirico, supra note 81, at 303.
270 See, e.g., Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that the
only evidence before the college disciplinary panel was the accuser's and the accused's ac-
counts); see also Baker, supra note 15, at 236-40 (noting the difficulties in proving these types
of cases).
271 See, e.g., David Lisak et al., False Allegations of Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten
Years of Reported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318, 1329-31 (2010) (finding a
5.9% false report rate in its study on sexual assaults investigated by a university police depart-
ment and reporting other studies that put the number between 2.1% and 10.9%).
272 See KC Johnson & Stewart Taylor Jr., Stanford Sex Assault Case: Sentence Was Too
Short-But the System Worked, WASH. POST: OPINIONs (June 8, 2016), http://wpo.st/5ha62.
273 ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at 193, 199; see also Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 575 (1975).
274 See Douglas R. Richmond, Students' Right to Counsel in University Disciplinary Pro-
ceedings, 15 J.C. & U.L. 289, 300 (1989); Lisa Tenerowicz, Note, Student Misconduct at
Private Colleges and Universities: A Roadmap for "Fundamental Fairness" in Disciplinary
Proceedings, 42 B.C. L. REV. 653, 691 (2001).
275 ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, supra note 32, at 193, 218.
276 See supra Part II.B.L
277 See Triplett, supra note 18, at 520-22.
278 TASLrrz, supra note 49, at 124; Nat'l Crime Victim Law Inst., supra note 242, at 4;
Lisa Hamilton Thielmeyer, Note, Beyond Maryland v. Craig: Can and Should Adult Rape
Victims Be Permitted to Testify by Closed-Circuit Television?, 67 IND. L.J. 797, 813 (1992).
279 See, e.g., Fan, supra note 234, at 781 & nn.34-3 7 ; Bennett L. Gershman, Child Wit-
nesses and Procedural Fairness, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 585, 586-88 (2001).
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mony that might not otherwise take place in the same way that the panel-
submission-only format does. Varying the format of shielding also of-
fers opportunities to reformers who believe that preserving face-to-face
confrontation serves fairness values. For example, two-way closed circuit
video can facilitate a form of face-to-face confrontation while still les-
sening some trauma. 280 Colleges could also determine the need for
screening in individual cases. 281 For example, trauma counselors with
appropriate training could make individualized determinations about
whether the harm to the witness would be significant enough to merit
screening. 282
Adopting an intermediary process can provide similar benefits, but
it has an additional cost. Similar to the panel-only-questioning model,
the intermediary's control of questions obstructs the accused's attempts
to frame his own narrative,2 83 especially if the accused disagrees with the
way the intermediary restructures a question, or if the intermediary ref-
uses to ask a question. However, the intermediary process would allevi-
ate most of the problems associated with cross-examination while still
retaining cross-examination in some form. Like the shielding process,
the victim does not have to confront her tormentor and suffer the accom-
panying anguish. 284 Similarly, through omission and alteration, the in-
termediary prevents damaging insinuations, or irrelevant attacks, from
reaching the victim. 2 85 Sustaining objections to the form of an already
asked question does not retract the question's assault on the victim; its
power to wreak havoc comes from its introduction into the testimonial
experience. 28 6 And again, lowering transaction costs for testifying vic-
tims improves the efficacy of the entire system.287
Additionally, while it will not do these additional points justice, a
few differences between judicial systems and college adjudications bear
mentioning when discussing ways to improve overall procedural fairness
with less cost to the accused's rights.
First, college adjudicators have more latitude than courts in devel-
oping procedure. 288  Concerns that implementing cross-examination
280 Fan, supra note 234, at 812-13; Friedman, supra note 200, at 702-03.
281 See Thielmeyer, supra note 278, at 813-14 (explaining how the process outlined in
Maryland v. Craig could be applied to adult victims in rape trials).
282 Kenniston, supra note 48, at 123-26 (proposing a reform that extends the Craig
approach).
283 See supra Part II.B.
284 See Kenniston, supra note 48, at 117, 120 (noting that with two-way video conferenc-
ing, victims avoid trauma and psychological harms).
285 TASLrrz, supra note 49, at 118-19, 125; Ellison, supra note 49, at 366.
286 See supra Part II.B.2.
287 See supra Part II.B.2.
288 See Ellison, supra note 49, at 366-69 (noting constraints that judicial systems
impose).
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would require a complex evidence code ignore that the administration
will only have to develop procedures and rules on topics that come up
frequently, such as a witness's other sexual experiences or consumption
of intoxicants.
Second, the complainant can have her own advocate in these adjudi-
cations. 28 9 One of the common criticisms of criminal trials is that prose-
cutors do not have the incentive to protect the victim because they do not
represent the victim. A prosecutor's goals may not align with minimiz-
ing harm to the victim on cross-examination. 2 9 0 College adjudications
relieve this problem by allowing for the presence of a victim's advocate
or attorney. 2 9 1
Third, the college adjudicatory system could become more profes-
sionalized without losing the benefits of keeping cases out of court. For
example, a hybrid system that involved "independent, professionally
trained investigators, litigators and judges" alleviates some of the con-
cerns about bias.2 9 2 Beyond concerns for bias, there is also the serious
problem that the school administrators responsible for these proceedings
are inexperienced in conducting investigations and adjudications. 29 3
Many of the investigators employed by the school do not adhere to even
the most rudimentary procedural-fairness practices followed by the po-
lice or other investigators (e.g., recording interviews or preserving
notes). 2 9 4 Another common challenge to these proceedings is delayed
notice; the defendant often only hears about charges for the first time
weeks or months after the event. 2 95 Furthermore, shortcomings affect
not only the wrongfully accused, but also victims and criminal prosecu-
tions. While Title IX's hawkish prosecution policies have led many col-
leges to become overcautious when interacting with victims, reports still
surface of ill-performed proceedings that psychologically harm victims
while simultaneously complicating or derailing successful criminal pros-
ecutions. 296 A formalized process, conducted by unbiased parties, could
result in more accurate and fair hearings, and fewer legal challenges to
these proceedings.
289 See, e.g., UNC Equal Opportunity and Compliance Office, supra note 45.
290 Lininger, supra note 5, at 1362, 1392, 1394-96.
291 See id. at 1398-1400; Campbell, supra note 244, at 705.
292 Sarah Edwards, Note, The Case in Favor of OCR's Tougher Title IX Policies: Pushing
Back Against the Pushback, 23 DUKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 121, 141 (2015); Quizon, supra
note 32.
293 McHugh & Farrow, supra note 26.
294 Feld, supra note 22.
295 See, e.g., McHugh & Farrow, supra note 26.
296 Nick DeSantis, Occidental College Reaches Deal to Resolve Investigations of Sexual-
Assault Cases, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Jun. 9, 2016), http://chronicle.com/
blogs/tickeroccidental-college-reaches-deal-to-resolve-investigation-of-sexual-assault-cases/
112074.
2017] 183
184 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 27:145
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
And while it should not be the primary consideration, colleges do
consider the financial benefits and costs of each procedure when creating
a policy. Many legal reformers fail to consider the administrative burden
cross-examination imposes because it has been such an established pro-
cedure. In both court and non-court settings, cross-examination prolongs
hearings and adds minor administrative costs. What starts as questioning
one testifying witness frequently devolves into a mini-trial of extrinsic
evidence and character witnesses because of the impeachment threat that
accompanies cross-examination. 297 To accommodate cross-examination,
a judicial system must invest more in developing rules governing the
scope of permissible questioning. 298 Once rules are in place, adjudica-
tors must be trained to control questioning so as to implement these
rules. 299
When it comes to college disciplinary proceedings, the mechanisms
for conducting cross-examination are not in place. 300 Reformers must
decide whether parties will assume responsibility for questioning or if it
should occur through another medium.301 Either internal or external
bodies must supervise and evaluate the implementation of these new pro-
cedures. As these costs increase, concomitant advantages that other fo-
rums have over the court system decrease. Implementing full-scale
cross-examination, shielding, or an intermediary procedure will each in-
flict new costs.
In addition, the intermediary procedure requires a substantial outlay
of other administrative resources. The equipment and technological in-
frastructure that can transmit questions directly, instantly, and correctly
from the accused to an intermediary does not come cheaply, 302 and infor-
mation-technology departments must monitor and repair the equipment.
Technology costs would only be the tip of the iceberg. Additionally, col-
leges would have to hire and train qualified intermediaries. 303 The sys-
tem would also require more review procedures. Colleges could train
297 See, e.g., Gerald L. Shargel, Federal Evidence Rule 608(b): Gateway to the Minefield
of Witness Preparation, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1263, 1290 (2007) (noting the ability for trials
to devolve into "confusing and time-consuming 'minitrials' on witnesses' collateral bad acts").
298 Thomas R. Baker, Cross-Examination of Witnesses in College Student Disciplinary
Hearings: A New York Case Rekindles an Old Controversy, 142 ED. LAw REP. I1, 29 (2000).
299 Id.
300 Triplett, supra note 18, at 514, 520; Jones v. State Bd. of Ed. Of & For State of Tenn.,
279 F. Supp. 190, 197 (M.D. Tenn. 1968) aff'd, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969).
301 See Triplett, supra note 18, at 525-26 (discussing access to counsel issues).
302 Costs will include initial outlay, upkeep, and regular updates. See, e.g., TASLIrz,
supra note 49, at 118-19; Kenniston, supra note 48, at 108-10, 117-18; Michael S. Quinn,
Comment, Wrotten but Not Dead: High Court of New York Signals Legislature to Review
Televised Testimony at Criminal Trial, 21 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 193, 198-202 (2011).
303 See, e.g., TASLITz, supra note 49, at 118-19; Ellison, supra note 49, at 365.
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panels on handling objections to changes the intermediary made to ques-
tions, but ruling on objections would add significant time to an already
lengthy process. 3 0 4 At the very least, colleges would have to provide an
avenue in the post-hearing appeals process to challenge the intermedi-
ary's questioning. Likewise, someone has to oversee the intermediaries
and the review process to ensure that each operates as intended. All of
these costs also have a first-mover disadvantage: the pioneering college
implementing this vast system will bear the brunt of learning costs and
regulatory backlash.
Yet, the administrative costs imposed by an intermediary method
might initially be overestimated, and the procedure confers ancillary ben-
efits that lower other administrative costs. Before questioning occurs,
initial edits help the accused understand the permissible scope of ques-
tioning. This transfers debates over major categories of exclusion from
the hearing process to the pre-hearing process, which could shorten hear-
ings. Colleges could also foreclose the need for lengthy appeals by im-
plementing a waiver doctrine in cases where the accused fails to object to
limitations that the initial editing process put him on notice of. Further-
more, only the intermediary would have to undergo training on handling
vulnerable witnesses, alleviating the need to train panel members and
advocates. Similarly, the intermediary could function as the conduit for
questions running not only between the accused and the complainant, but
also for all witness questioning. This minimizes the need to provide ad-
vocates when the college does not want the parties directly questioning
witnesses.
Determining which measures to adopt requires balancing, but im-
plementing at least some of these measures mollify concerns that protect-
ing victims will come exclusively at the cost of the accused. Examining
alternatives to full cross-examination or no cross-examination demon-
strates that colleges do not have to import the exact trial format of cross-
examination to receive some of its benefits.
CONCLUSION
The two alternatives to cross-examination discussed in this Article
constitute only a small subset of possible reforms colleges can undertake
when adjusting the format of cross-examination and the adjudication it-
self. The adjudication of sexual-assault allegations-which typically in-
volve not only credibility contests but also vulnerable victim witnesses-
brings into sharp relief both the benefits and the costs of cross-examina-
tion. Accordingly, the accommodations universities have attempted, and
304 See Zajac et al., supra note 50, at 196 (noting administrative costs associated with
intervening in cross-examination of children and why that may lead to judges intervening less).
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will attempt, in order to address such accusations provide useful insights
into the optimal format for cross-examination.
Like colleges, legislatures and courts shy away from broad and
overarching reform in trial procedure. Society may never agree on defi-
nitions for amorphous concepts like "truth" or "fairness." Without paral-
lel universes, one cannot compare how much truth or deception a
procedure produces in each unique, fact-specific context. Likewise, it is
hard to measure a procedure's dignitary or fairness value. Balancing un-
known costs against unknown benefits does not lead to a satisfying an-
swer. As the late Justice Scalia remarked, it is "like judging whether a
particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy."305
But the immeasurability of some quantities does not justify declar-
ing the status quo the best and only choice. Hope that a balance will
eventually work itself out provide cold comfort to those who receive the
worst of a system's shortcoming. Legal challenges to administrative
hearings, civil proceedings, and criminal trials confront judges with the
undesirable task of deciding what procedure most closely approximates
an accurate and fair outcome. 306
Most would agree that reducing trauma to victims and approving the
efficacy of judicial systems represent worthwhile goals. Part of the hesi-
tation to change comes from knowable unknowns. Would a procedure
actually encourage more victims to come forward? How much does it
cost to maintain employees and equipment necessary to effectuate these
procedures? Do these procedures reduce long-term harm to victims? In-
novations in the college-adjudication context could generate empirical
answers to each of these questions. 307
Tradition also forms a large part of the resistance to change. Practi-
tioners and policymakers eschew hard evidence for tired references to
legal tradition. Judges cite precedent as if recycling and restating unt-
ested assumptions validates them. Of the pages and pages of legal schol-
arship spent on cross-examination, musing on constitutional doctrine and
legal exegesis far outnumber articles citing empirical or scientific re-
search. Perhaps these critiques are unfair. If a specific legal doctrine
controls then the inquiry is truly at its end. However, questions sur-
rounding cross-examination rarely admit of such tidy and definitive
answers.
305 Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
306 One early Supreme Court formulation candidly characterized the due-process inquiry
as balancing the "hurt complained of and good accomplished." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951).
307 For example, the Court's Confrontation-Clause jurisprudence could learn much from
what shielding procedures for adult witnesses entails. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 4, at
1645.
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For the most part, the historical and institutional baggage of the
court system does not burden college adjudications. Colleges are con-
structing their own procedures, and they can account for the most recent
empirical research when they do so. College adjudications can also serve
to demonstrate the flaws and virtues of new structures and inform future
changes to the legal system as a whole. They present an opportunity to
reconsider the balance between the interests of the accused, the victim,
and the system. Slavish adherence to assumed truths leads to worse in-
stitutional outcomes in both the college system and the court system.
Even the best engines need a tune-up; it is time to reexamine assump-
tions about cross-examination.
